African Journal of
Political Science and
International Relations

AJ ACADEMIC JOURNALS
expand your knowledge

About AJPSIR

African Journal of Political Science and International Relations (AJPSIR) is an open access journal that publishes rigorous theoretical reasoning and advanced empirical research in all areas of the subjects. We welcome articles or proposals from all perspectives and on all subjects pertaining to Africa, Africa's relationship to the world, public policy, international relations, comparative politics, political methodology, political theory, political history and culture, global political economy, strategy and environment.

Indexing

The African Journal of Political Science and International Relations is indexed in:

Dimensions Database, Google Scholar, Matrix of information for the analysis of journals (MIAR) Microsoft Academic

AJPSIR has an h5-index of 7 on Google Scholar Metrics

Open Access Policy

Open Access is a publication model that enables the dissemination of research articles to the global community without restriction through the internet. All articles published under open access can be accessed by anyone with internet connection.

The African Journal of Political Science and International Relations is an Open Access journal. Abstracts and full texts of all articles published in this journal are freely accessible to everyone immediately after publication without any form of restriction.

Article License

Self-Archiving Policy

The African Journal of Political Science and International Relations is a RoMEO green journal. This permits authors to archive any version of their article they find most suitable, including the published version on their institutional repository and any other suitable website.

Please see http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/search.php?issn=1684-5315

Digital Archiving Policy

The African Journal of Political Science and International Relations is committed to the long-term preservation of its content. All articles published by the journal are preserved by Portico. In addition, the journal encourages authors to archive the published version of their articles on their institutional repositories and as well as other appropriate websites.

https://www.portico.org/publishers/ajournals/

Metadata Harvesting

The African Journal of Political Science and International Relations encourages metadata harvesting of all its content. The journal fully supports and implement the OAI version 2.0, which comes in a standard XML format. See Harvesting Parameter

Memberships and Standards

OPEN ACCESS

Academic Journals strongly supports the Open Access initiative. Abstracts and full texts of all articles published by Academic Journals are freely accessible to everyone immediately after publication.

creative commons

All articles published by Academic Journals are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). This permits anyone to copy, redistribute, remix, transmit and adapt the work provided the original work and source is appropriately cited.

Crossref

Crossref is an association of scholarly publishers that developed Digital Object Identification (DOI) system for the unique identification published materials. Academic Journals is a member of Crossref and uses the DOI system. All articles published by Academic Journals are issued DOI.

Similarity Check powered by iThenticate is an initiative started by CrossRef to help its members actively engage in efforts to prevent scholarly and professional plagiarism. Academic Journals is a member of Similarity Check.

CrossRef Cited-by Linking (formerly Forward Linking) is a service that allows you to discover how your publications are being cited and to incorporate that information into your online publication platform. Academic Journals is a member of CrossRef Cited-by.

<idpf>

Academic Journals is a member of the International Digital Publishing Forum (IDPF). The IDPF is the global trade and standards organization dedicated to the development and promotion of electronic publishing and content consumption.

[COUNTER](#) (Counting Online Usage of Networked Electronic Resources) is an international initiative serving librarians, publishers and intermediaries by setting standards that facilitate the recording and reporting of online usage statistics in a consistent, credible and compatible way. Academic Journals is a member of [COUNTER](#)

[Portico](#) is a digital preservation service provided by ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the academic community use digital technologies to preserve the scholarly record and to advance research and teaching in sustainable ways.

Academic Journals is committed to the long-term preservation of its content and uses [Portico](#)

Academic Journals provides an [OAI-PMH](#)(Open Archives Initiatives Protocol for Metadata Harvesting) interface for metadata harvesting.

Contact

Editorial Office: ajpsir@academicjournals.org

Help Desk: helpdesk@academicjournals.org

Website: http://www.academicjournals.org/journal/AJPSIR

Submit manuscript online   http://ms.academicjournals.org

Academic Journals

73023 Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria

ICEA Building, 17th Floor,

Kenyatta Avenue, Nairobi, Kenya.

Dr. Dirk Kotzé
Political Sciences Department
University of South Africa (UNISA)
South Africa.

Prof. S. M. Omodia
Department of Political Science
Kogi State University
Anyigba,
Nigeria.

Dr. Maria Barbal Campayo
Central China Normal University
152, Luoyu Avenue, 430079 Wuhan, Hubei,
People's Republic of China.

Table of Content

AJ ACADEMIC JOURNALS
expand your knowledge

African Journal of Political Science and International Relations

Review

Manifest destiny and foreign relations: Examining the Nigeria-South Africa contradiction

ADETUNJI, Olumuyiwa Adebayo[1*] and ADEWUMI, Eyitayo Folasade[2]

[1]Department of Political Science, School of Arts and Social Sciences, Federal College of Education, Abeokuta, Ogun State, Nigeria.
[2]Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Babcock University, Ilishan-Remo, Ogun State, Nigeria.

This article analyses the dichotomy between potentials and capabilities with respect to Nigeria-South Africa relations and how this impinges on the leadership contest majorly involving the two countries. It observed that the international recognition accorded South Africa pitched it against Nigeria though, there are other contenders including Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Rwanda to mention a few for the leadership slot. To determine the leadership contest, this illustrative paper adopts descriptive and comparative methods to match the potentials vis-à-vis capabilities of Nigeria with South Africa in resolving the leadership contest. After a review of the foregoing issues, the study found out that though Nigeria was traditionally acknowledged as the giant of Africa, certain internal contradictions were not in tandem with Nigeria's leadership status as it remained a country of potentials lacking the edge to provide leadership for the rest of the continent. It concludes that South Africa appeared to meet the criteria for leadership to a greater extent and as such should be considered as the leader of the continent though competition cannot be ruled out by other contenders.

Key words: Manifest potentials, strengths, leadership, foreign relations, leadership contest.

INTRODUCTION

The dichotomy between potential and real power in itself is a recipe for development though not all potentials translate to development or growth in the long run. Nigeria at inception was a country of potentials as it ranked alongside a number of leading nations in Asia, South America, the Carribeans and Europe. At inception, the economy of the country was projected positively owing to the groundnut and cocoa pyramids in the North, the growth of agriculture in the former western region as well as the industrial potentials of the then eastern region.

All of these strengths ensured the country became a rallying point for countries in Africa who had conferred on Nigeria the leadership position of the continent of Africa.

These potentials or early signs of development ensured that its image was projected positively within West Africa, within and outside the African continent. On the continent, Nigeria's image ranked high as it was a rallying point among other countries in Africa as reflected in the adoption of an Afro-centric foreign policy. In view of Nigeria's leading status, it has become pertinent to

examine how these competencies are being deployed in the current circumstance especially now that there are other contenders for leadership position on the continent.

Three decades after that, a lot has changed with respect to Nigeria's image and perception in and outside Africa. While a number of reasons could be adduced for this, the entry of other formidable forces into reckoning including South Africa, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia with seeming leadership ambitions clearly undermines Nigeria's relevance on the continent. This development apart from affecting her rating internationally also takes a toll on Nigeria's relations with contemporaries in and outside the continent. It is on this premise that this paper seeks to assess the growing contest for leadership position in Africa with a view to examining the contradictions that determine relations between Nigeria and South Africa.

The paper adopts a descriptive and comparative method to explain, analyse, compare and contrast Nigeria's strengths vis-à-vis South Africa's within the context of the dynamics of relations between Nigeria and South Africa.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Manifest destiny

The concept 'Manifest Destiny' coined in the 19th century was used to connote United States influence across North America and other regions of the world. The term emphasized the right of the United States of America to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which providence had been given to it for the development and liberty of all (McCrisken, 2002). The term manifest destiny literally connotes the capacity of a state to either expand its frontiers or lead others based on leadership, capacity, strength and ability. A further probe into McCrisken's submission reveals that America's influence has today gone beyond North America, but felt across the entire world, a position corroborated by Hanson and Beisner (2003) who submitted that America by virtue of its size, strength in critical sectors has since emerged as a dominant power not only within the North America today but also across the entire world at large.

This term is also akin to Nigeria's leadership role in Africa due to its sense of responsibility to the black race and the big brother role to most countries on the continent. Similarly, Nigeria became a notable voice not only in West Africa, but across the entire continent shortly after independence after it emerged as a power broker in Africa through numerous interventions including its Afro-centric foreign policy and expansion of foreign missions between 1960 and 1980 which was to give effect to her hegemonic role in Africa (Saliu, 2009). These interventions were not accidental but aimed at cementing

her leadership position in Africa especially after Nigeria's leadership qualities on the continent were acknowledged by other states therein (Bach, 2007). Just as Nigeria was developing capacity to cement, its leadership position in Africa, South Africa amongst other formidable contenders were also expanding their base and influence in Africa. Between 1994 and 2000, South Africa's experienced socio-economic and industrial growth enough to attract support from the international community and within the continent to assume leadership position in Africa. Incidentally, Nigeria's capacity began to decline around the same time South Africa's profile kept rising thereby making other states on the continent to seek alternatives with respect to the leadership of the continent. Presently, there are a number of countries positioning themselves for the leadership of the continent among whom are South Africa and Nigeria now perceived as rivals for leadership position on the continent. As the leadership contest continues to rage on, this paper attempts to put in context the strengths and contradictions of Nigeria and South Africa with a view to establishing how the contest affects foreign relations. To achieve this, the concept of foreign relations is conceptualized.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Literarily, the term foreign relations denote the level of relations or interaction that exists between states whether at bilateral or multilateral levels. Because, relations do not take place within the territorial boundary of any state, relations and interactions that are conducted within the international system can be subsumed under foreign relations. Foreign relations are defined by goals and targets that states seek to realize when they relate, expand or in some instances severe diplomatic ties. As states continue to relate, foreign relations continue to evolve. Though, foreign relations is largely expected to be cordial and friendly, relations can sometimes be hostile and strained due to a number of factors which the parties involved are predisposed to. In the middle of relations between states are multilateral organisations viz-multinational corporations and international organisations which midwive the actualization of set goals and objectives by respective states. Even when relations become strained, multilateral organisations serve as vehicles to repair foreign relations which are in realization of national interest and objectives. Since states are entities with individual national interest and set objectives, it then becomes necessary for states to seek partners who would be of assistance in achieving set goals. It is important to reiterate that no state can single-handedly achieve set goals and objectives except with other states at the sub-regional, regional, or global levels. Considering the fact that national interest forms part of what drives foreign relations, Saliu (2009) identified what makes up the national interests of states to include

national policies and objectives, needed infrastructures and framework needed by citizens to improve their daily survival as well as social security programmes to aid or fast track development and the pursuit of happiness. For most third world countries, infrastructure deficit remains a challenge hence, the need for states to seek help from willing countries. While states with relatively stable economies require friendly nations to either supply needed items or buy raw materials or manufactured goods. For example, the goal driving the foreign relations of the United States of America may not be driven by obtaining loans to develop infrastructure but perhaps for the purpose of stimulating economy or for establishing military bases in order to keep an eye on suspected or assumed adversaries. This cannot be compared with Nigeria which obtain loans to meet the deficit in infrastructure. In all, the point is that states establish and sustain foreign relations for different purposes depending on foreign policy goals and national interests.

Examining foreign relations within the context of Nigeria and South Africa would be to examine relations between two sub-Saharan countries who share a similar history of colonization and imperialism. Though, Nigeria attained independence much earlier than South Africa, foreign relations between them remains largely unpredictable and sometimes characterised by love-hate relationship (Okolo, 2008). From 1994 when relations between the two former colonies were established, relations have continued to fluctuate between cordiality, hostility, confrontation and combative (Akinboye, 2005; Ebegbulem, 2013; Wapmuk, 2010; Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012). Despite the fact that Nigeria made the defeat of the obnoxious and discriminatory apartheid policy a major goal, both countries have not been able to leverage on that to ensure cordial foreign relations is sustained. Part of what has culminated in strained relations between Nigeria and South Africa has been the seemingly leadership contest which apart from pitching some African giants against one another, has also led to open confrontation between these two sub-Saharan giants. Though relations remain unpredictable, the leadership contest involving the two would continue to define and condition relations between the two frontline states.

NIGERIA'S POTENTIALS VIS-A-VIS STRENGTHS

At independence, Nigeria exhibited attributes of leadership in Africa going by her influence in regional affairs most notably her participation in the struggle to liberate a number of African states from the clutches of colonialism. This development informed Adebajo's (2006) categorisation of Nigeria as a pivotal state in the continent alongside South Africa going by their leadership roles on the continent. On the hegemonic roles played by Nigeria and South Africa in Africa, Ogunnubi (2017) and Tella (2019) held different positions on the issue. For Ogunnubi, he contended that Nigeria should not be involved in any

leadership contest with any country in Africa let alone South Africa, a country it freed from the repressive and discriminatory policy. On the other hand, Tella (2019) submitted that both Nigeria and South Africa were powerhouses on the continent and that both states should be accorded the same respect. Though, with varying views, it is important to note that South Africa has considerable influence in Africa, a development which ultimately qualifies her as a rival to Nigeria, a country traditionally recognised as the only voice in Africa. Now that South Africa's has been acknowledged as a contender for leadership of the continent, a contest for leadership has been established. To critically analyse the foregoing points, the capacity of the competing states to transform their burden potentials to actual strengths and capabilities would go a long way to resolve the leadership contest. To further analyse these issues one after the other, the potentials of Nigeria would be discussed in context of the foregoing discussion.

The potentials which present Nigeria as a country capable of leading the continent includes its population, participation in United Nations Organisation peace keeping missions, as well as her membership of multilateral organisations (Adetunji, 2018). This project Nigeria's image positively within and outside the continent though; there has been a debate as to how the country has effectively utilized these key indicators to its advantage. In view of similar leadership aspirations by other African states including Rwanda, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco and Egypt and South Africa to mention a few, the question of who provides leadership on the continent remains largely unresolved. Since Nigeria's towering leadership role in Africa is now under question, it would be important to determine how much of the potentials of Nigeria have been transformed to capacities alongside its perennial competitor, South Africa.

ECONOMIC POTENTIALS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

Economic potentials or indicators no doubt contribute a lot to how states perform domestically or internationally or whether it is perceived as a powerful or weak nation. In a similar vein, economic potentials go a long way to determine the manner of foreign relations states enter into because more than often, economic gains and growth are the fulcrum of foreign relations. On the economic angle, economic and trade relations premised critical sectors such as manufacturing, telecommunications, Oil and gas, banking, Real Estate, Media and Retail marketing to mention a few have also formed basis of foreign relations between Nigeria and South Africa (Adetunji, 2018). To this end, it is safe to posit that while economic power boosts or influences foreign relations, foreign relations on the other hand is incumbent upon economic strength because, it aids the development of economies of states thereby improving their competitive abilities and global rating. That explains

why leading states including the United States of America, China, Germany, France and Russia continually dominate international affairs due to their strong economies. On the continent of Africa, trade volumes between Nigeria and South Africa which started from 89.1 million rand in 1994 reached a peak of 29.4 billion by the end of 2016 (Adetunji, 2018). Incidentally, these economic exchanges and trade relations which formed the basis of relations since 1994 also doubles as the basis of competition due to leadership ambitions on the continent making relations fluctuating between competition and cooperation (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012). In all, economic potentials serve as backbone for states to assert their authority within the framework of bilateral and multilateral relations and global politics. To further put in context the foregoing discussion, it would be important to provide an in-depth analysis of the potentials and capabilities of Africa's two powerhouses, Nigeria and South Africa.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA-SOUTH AFRICA POTENTIALS VIS-À-VIS CAPABILITIES

To embark on a comparative analysis of the potentials and capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa is to examine their strengths vis-a-vis weaknesses. There is no denying the fact that Nigeria and South Africa are two power houses on the continent of Africa capable of providing a direction for the continent. How well the two states are able to realize their failures and manage their successes would go a long way to resolving the leadership question in Africa in particular albeit determine Africa's fate in general (Tella, 2019).

One of the foremost bases of comparisons between Nigeria and South Africa is economic strength going by the categorisation of their economy as first and third leading economies on the continent respectively (Tella, 2019). Irrespective of the ranking, economic indicators continue to fluctuate placing Nigeria's economy above South Africa and vice versa. Though, both states boast of strong economies as indicated in the volumes of trade peaking at 29.4 billion ZAR in 2016 (DTI, 2016), there exist some level of competition over which of the countries has more business presence outside its territory. As growth indicators continue to dwindle with nation's economies facing uncertainties, it is yet to be seen how Nigeria's economy would maintain its leadership position in sub-Saharan Africa or Africa in general. Apart from trade volumes between the two states serving as basis for bilateral relations, there exist other competitive areas including the development of the agro–allied industry where South Africa appears to be doing well as depicted in the global competiveness ranking which ranked South Africa in the 49th position as opposed to Nigeria's 124th position in 2016 (Ogunnubi, 2017). South Africa's strength in the agro-allied industry which guarantees the local production consumer items

cannot be compared to Nigeria where there is a heavy reliance on importation of consumer items including rice, wheat and sugar. The over reliance of Nigeria on importation of consumer goods cannot guarantee self-sufficiency thereby exposing the economy to the market forces which are largely exploitative.

Another area of comparison is the aviation sector where South Africa unlike Nigeria boasts of a national career, the South African airways, a leading airline in Africa. Interestingly, Nigerians who travel abroad patronise South Africa airways (SAA), a company partly owned by the South African government. The implication of having a national career cannot be overstated considering the huge revenue boost to the economy contributing significantly to the gross domestic product and overall the growth of the economy. Simply put, any country that is serious about expanding its revenue base as well as limiting the exploitative tendencies of other states should consider having a national carrier in view of its importance. This paper queries how Nigeria implements the bilateral air service agreement it enters with countries when it does not have a national carrier of its own to fully exploit the opportunities in those agreements.

Similarly, South Africa boasts of a military industrial complex used to ensure the production of arms and ammunitions to meet internal security requirements and for the protection of the nation's territorial integrity. Despite Nigeria's successes in peacekeeping missions within and outside Africa, one key area it is lacking is in the area of local manufacturing of arms and ammunitions. Because the production of military hardware is crucial to addressing national security concerns as well as determining the preponderance of power, it then implies that Nigeria is not a strong country militarily in the real sense as it continues to rely on allies including United States of America, Russia, China and Pakistan to meet demands for arms and ammunitions. This implies that the country remains subservient to these states despite her independence and sovereign status (Adetunji, 2018). This is not to mention the huge costs that are involved to procuring of arms and ammunitions which continue to be a major revenue earner for the affected countries. For instance, Nigeria's lack of capacity in local production of arms played out during the controversies that greeted the seizure of $15 million cash by the South African authorities meant to procure fire arms for the Nigerian armed forces against insurgency in North-East (Nwosu, 2014). If Nigeria is to reduce the rate of security breaches across parts of the country, then, it must begin to put machinery in place to fill this void.

One other indicator for measuring strength is the existence of a viable steel industry. South Africa has a viable steel industry providing raw materials for the production of arms and ammunition and automobiles serving as a major revenue boaster for its economy. As the country strives to bring back the *Ajaokuta* steel

complex into full operations, South Africa on the other hand has taken full advantage of its steel sector not only to drive the growth of its economy but also serve as a model for other states on the continent who are lacking in this regard. A corollary to the steel industry is the capacity to manufacture cars and other categories of automobiles and machineries. South Africa's steel industry acts as sine-qua-non for the assemblage of major car brands including Mercedes Benz, Dodge, Volkswagen, Ford, Chevrolet, Nissan, Toyota and Honda Kia and Hyundai amongst others. Nigeria on the other hand boasts of only Innoson vehicle motors (IVM), a private firm that assembles and manufactures cars in Nnewi, Imo state. The implication is that while the South African government has supported the car industry through the provision of the enabling environment, Nigeria cannot boast of same competency of manufacturing of automobiles and machineries.

Another important indicator for determining a strong and buoyant economy is power generation considered as a major driver for growth and development. By the end of 2018, the capacity of power generation in Nigeria was put at 7,500 megawatts (Channels TV, 2018) while that of South Africa was put at 34,000mw (Eskom, 2018). The electricity power generation capacity of 7,500 mw when matched with a population of over 200,000,000 perhaps explains why provision of stable power supply remains a challenge despite the huge investments in the power sector. South Africa on the other hand with a population of a little above 51,000,000 people boasts 34,000 mw of power used to provide power into homes and drive industries. The challenges with regular power supply continue to hurt the Nigerian economy especially the micro, small and medium enterprises who cannot contribute their quota to sustainable economic growth and progress.

From the foregoing, most of the analysed growth indicators seem to favour South Africa at the expense of Nigeria which has recorded more shortcomings generally. This reality is that Nigeria's supposed leadership position in Africa is being called to question by its perennial competitor. How Nigeria would assert its authority on the continent is yet to be seen going by the current realities but a further slope down in the economic indicators would ultimately favour South Africa. In addition to these are contradictions in the political landscape part of which form the next focus.

POLITICAL EVOLUTION SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Interestingly, Nigeria and South Africa share similar colonial history with Britain overseeing the affairs of both countries at one point in time. Nigeria's colonial occupation which culminated in the merger of Northern and Southern protectorate into one country came to an end in 1960 when the country attained political independence while South Africa went through an entirely different course occasioned by minority rule under the apartheid policy. Comparatively, while several states in Africa including Nigeria had attained independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, South Africa was still subjected to foreign rule until 1994 when it jettisoned minority rule thereby paving the way for its first multi-racial elections leading to the emergence of Nelson Mandela as South Africa's first non–racial President in 1994.

From 1994 when the former apartheid enclave became independent and sovereign, South Africa has successfully transferred power from Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa as the incumbent president. Nigeria on the other hand after attaining independence went through different phases including parliamentary system of government which was truncated by the first military coup d' etat in 1966. After years of military rule, Nigeria returned to the path of democracy in 1979 when it held her first transition programme following the election of Late Shehu Shagari (Ikime, 1980). The tenure of Shehu Shagari was also cut short by another military interregnum that led to coups and counter coups until 1999 when the current fourth republic was institutionalized. From 1999 to date, Nigeria had transferred power under successive administrations including former Presidents; Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), Umar Musa Yar'adua (2007-2010), Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015) and presently, President Muhammadu Buhari (2015 to date).

On a comparative note, Nigeria attained political independence much earlier than South Africa though punctuated by several military interregnums. But unlike Nigeria that witnessed interruptions in its political evolution since independence, South Africa on the other hand has not witnessed any interruptions since 1994 as it had successfully transferred power from one administration to another. On the governance level, Nigeria and South Africa do not really differ as they have both struggled with high inflation, high unemployment rate, infrastructure deficit, corruption allegations against top government officials and insecurity among others (Tetenyi, 2014). For instance, except for the tenure of Nelson Mandela 1994-1999, subsequent administrations have either left office unceremoniously either due to corruption allegations or due to some perceived inadequacies or infractions (Adetunji, 2018). For example, Former President Thabo Mbeki could not complete his tenure after he was forced to step down owing to a no-confidence vote by the African National Congress (ANC) (Cooksey, 2008). Similar fates befell former President Jacob Zuma who was alleged to have corruptly enriched himself, an allegation currently before a South African court (BBC, 2018). In a similar fashion, former Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan who was in office about the same time as Zuma also faced corruption allegation while in office especially over the

alleged pilfering of state resources to prosecute the 2015 general elections. Comparatively, while Jacob Zuma was arraigned in court to answer for his misdeeds in office, Goodluck Jonathan was neither arraigned as he denied all corruption allegations levelled against him, though a few of his appointees were charged with corruption allegation. In terms of holding leaders accountable, South Africa slightly differs from Nigeria as it has proven it is a country where there are no perceived sacred cows or untouchables where past leaders can be prosecuted or called to account for their deeds while in office. In the case of Nigeria, no Nigerian former President or Head of State (military or Civilian) has been prosecuted or called to answer for their deeds while in office despite several corruption allegations levelled against them.

On the political scene, the governments of Nigeria and South Africa continue to evolve as the citizenry mount pressure on the government to perform and solve mounting economic challenges which continue to threaten livelihoods. As the expectations for good governance continue to rise, the governments of the two countries need to ensure that economic growth is stimulated to solve inherent challenges including growing poverty rate, high levels of unemployment, and poor performance of institutions of government among others require urgent attention.

INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Another basis or ground for comparison is their respective roles in international engagement. Although, Nigeria and South Africa stand tall when it comes to international engagements, this has also been a basis for rivalry. Nigeria's foray into international engagements could be said to have started soon after independence when she adopted an Afro-centric foreign policy to drive her interest of developing the sub-region and Africa as a whole. Not only that election as the chairman of the United Nations committee for action against apartheid as well as its hosting of the UN anti-apartheid conference in 1977 to coordinate the efforts of the UNO to defeat apartheid in South Africa leading to the defeat of apartheid and leftover colonial vestiges in Africa (Adebajo, 2006; Akinboye, 2007; Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012), earned Nigeria respect within and outside the continent. Some of these roles which include advocacy for the emancipation of the African continent from colonial domination, the search for common solutions to various conflicts in Africa, addressing the continent's chronic poverty and underdevelopment among others earned her the title of 'giant of Africa' (Enikanolaiye, 2013).

Comparatively, South Africa on the other hand also distinguished itself through interventions in international engagement including participation in peacekeeping missions in several troubled states in Africa including Angola, Congo, Cote d'ivoire and Sudan to mention a few

(Tetenyi, 2014). Some of these interventions which made Pretoria the sixth largest troop contributing country to UN peacekeeping missions portrays her as a country committed to the stability of the sub-region and the continent in the general (Aribisala, 2013). In addition, Pretoria has also distinguished itself in AU and UN interventions on the continent including midwiving the power sharing arrangement between former President Lauren Gbagbo and Allasane Outtara following political crisis that engulfed the disputed Ivorian presidential elections in 2007 (Routman and Taiwo, 2011). At this juncture, this article acknowledges the prominent roles played by Nigeria and South Africa not just as leading figures in Africa, but through their laudable contributions to restoring peace in troubled parts of the continent, though, this paper acknowledges that some of the interventions were informed by the hegemonic influence and leadership position which they tried to exhibit over the rest of the continent.

INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURE

Another basis of comparative analysis is international exposure by way of regularity of state visits by world leaders and global personalities. In the last ten years, South Africa have played hosts to notable world leaders including former President Barrack Obama in 2013, President Xi Jinping of China in 2018 and German President, Frank Walter Steinmeier in 2018 (Katz, 2015; Xinhua, 2018; eNCA, 2018). Within the same period, Nigeria played host to notable world leaders including Britain's former Prime Minister Theresa May, French President, Emmanuel Macron as well as the former US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson all in 2018 (Obia and Enumah, 2018; Adekunle, 2018; Kazeem, 2018). While the two countries have had a fair share of state visits by world leaders and global personalities, the decision by the former President of the United States of America, Barrack Obama to visit South Africa at the expense of Nigeria during his 2013 African tour (Katz, 2015) further cast doubt on his confidence in Nigeria and seeming preference over South Africa to lead the rest of the continent. Though, this single development may not be enough to determine the leadership contest in Africa, it nonetheless adds impetus to a seemingly leadership contest between the two countries.

Closely related to state visits by world leaders are membership of Nigeria and South Africa in international organisations. International or multilateral organisations provide a good platform for states to reach out to other parts of the world as well as seek to achieve national interest which *ab initio* cannot be achieved individually. It is on record that Nigeria and South Africa are member states of regional and international organisations including African Union and United Nations Organisation respectively, South Africa's membership of blocs such as

BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa- a forum of cooperation and synergy consisting of developing economies around the world, G20 – a group of central banks governors seeking the promotion of international financial stability (Ramachandran, 2015) and IBSA forum consisting on India, Brazil and South Africa confer on her some kind of leadership status in Africa at the expense of Nigeria. On the other hand, Nigeria's membership of OPEC, the body saddled with the responsibility of regulating crude oil supplies and prices globally also stand Nigeria out with respect to how OPEC is influencing the world's economy. Comparatively, South Africa's membership of three key multilateral organisations as opposed to Nigeria's membership of one clearly puts South Africa ahead of Nigeria in terms of ranking and international exposure.

At this juncture, it is quite clear that South Africa enjoys more leverage internationally than Nigeria. How South Africa that only attained political independence in 1994 managed to overtake Nigeria with regards to membership of key multilateral organisations is a pointer to the decline of Nigeria's influence in Africa and the growth of South Africa in this regard to. Closely related is the corruption perception index of South Africa vis-a-vis Nigeria by the international community, one of which is the corruption perception index (CPI). Several African states are confronted with corrupt tendencies by successive administrations which have not only affected government performance, but also created an international image crisis that ultimately affects foreign relations (Adewumi, 2015). On the corruption perception index, Nigeria ranks 148th position out of 180 countries while South Africa ranks as the 71st nation according to Transparency International ranking (Transparency International, 2018). The fall out is that none is free of corrupt tendencies, but South Africa is however doing better than Nigeria going by the ranking from the international body.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL SAFETY NETS

In respect to human rights issues, South Africa appears to be doing far better as fundamental freedoms such as press freedom, human rights, right to public protest and transparency in government are largely guaranteed. The arraignment of former President Jacob Zuma alleged to have corruptly enriched himself in office was quite symbolic as it proved that it is a society where there are no sacred cows (BBC, 2018). Conversely, Nigeria remains a society where issues of press freedom, right to peaceful assembly and protest among other human rights provisions is still a growing concern (Ekwowusi, 2019). In Nigeria, there have been widespread reports of human right abuses and the demand for police permit to hold rallies. The abuses which are clearly not in tandem with democratic principles have called for change of approach by security agencies over their obvious disregard to

human rights of citizens. Closely related to this is the access to government information under the freedom of information act intended to ensure transparency and accountability in governance (Nwoke, 2019). It is worth noting that despite the promulgation of the freedom of information (FOI) act in 2011, there are still fundamental challenges assessing information at the federal level. How then can citizens ensure transparency and accountability when they do not have access to information at the federal level or even the sub-national level over the delay by some state houses of assembly to domesticate the FOI act thereby making it practically impossible to assess government books for proper scrutiny (Asemota, 2019)? This remains one area of concern over the respect of human rights especially with the refusal by the government to respect court pronouncements and judgements on the minimum number of days a suspect can be held in custody before arraignment. For example, the disregard of judicial pronouncements over the release of the leader of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, Sheikh Ibrahim El–Zakzaky by the federal government have further alluded to the fact that judicial pronouncements are still not respected in Nigeria (Tijani, 2019).

Another aspect which touches on welfare is the provision of social society nets by the government. Social safety nets are programmes targeted at poor, hopeless and vulnerable members of the society with a view to ensuring that poverty is reduced while providing some relief for this category of people. On a comparative note, the republic of South Africa has an institutionalized social welfare scheme consisting of multiple cash grants to targeted poor households, conditional cash grants, child support grant and disability grants (Jacobs et al., 2010). Its social safety nets targeted at poor and vulnerable households has seen support given to 13.9 million beneficiaries at the end of 2009/2010 fiscal year (Jacobs et al., 2010). Though, there are still concerns about growing inequality and structured poverty in the former apartheid enclave, the expansion of the social safety schemes would help mitigate this.

Nigeria on the other hand until recently did not have sustainable social security schemes which made poverty alleviation programme a difficult task. But that narrative changed with the administration of former President Goodluck Jonathan following the introduction of the Sure-P scheme set up to plough back the savings from the removal of subsidy on petroleum products into programmes that would empower the Nigerian youth (Nwosu and Ugwuerua, 2014). The SURE-P programme has since been expanded by the present administration through the Social Intervention Programmes (SIPs) consisting of the N-power, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) and the National Home-grown school feeding programmes (N-SIP, 2020). Other interventions include the Federal Government Enterprise and Empowerment Programmes (GEEP) consisting of *Market-Moni, Trader*

Moni and Farmer Moni estimated to reached a total of 2, 238, 726 beneficiaries (N-SIP, 2020). These programmes developed for the purpose of impacting the poor and vulnerable members of the society (Kolawole and Emmanual, 2018; Okogba, 2018) are expected to lift millions of Nigerians from poverty especially as the number of poor Nigerians continue to increase reaching a peak of 91.6 million in 2019 (Akinkuotu, 2019). This number which is the highest in the world has earned Nigeria a title of being tagged as the poverty capital of the world. To this end, it is important for the government across all levels to ensure that the growing number of poor people is drastically reduced through sustained interventions to improve their living conditions and get them out of the poverty bracket. Comparatively, it can be seen that both countries have existing social safety nets designed to improve the conditions of the poor and vulnerable members of the society, however; certain distinctions need to be spelt out. First is that social security schemes in Nigeria are yet to be institutionalized compared to what is obtainable in South Africa. While efforts of the current administration are worthy of commendation, it is more important to ensure that these programmes are strengthened and sustained to outlive the tenure of the current administration. While South Africa's scheme appear institutionalised, Nigeria can take a cue by making sure that growing poverty is reduced through these interventions for that constitutes one of the roles of government.

The existence of social security schemes takes us to the poverty level in these case studies. A significant proportion of the populations of Nigeria and South Africa are within the poverty bracket, though with some slight variations. According to Akinkuotu (2019), Nigeria has the highest number of poor people put at 91.6 million, the highest in the world. South Africa on the other hand with an estimated population of 51 million has about 30.4 million living in extreme poverty (Koyo, 2019). On a scale, Nigeria and South Africa have close to half of their population living in extreme poverty, a development this paper opines is not supportive of growth and development plans. How does Nigeria and South Africa have about half of their population living below the poverty line despite having social safety nets? Could it mean that the existing social safety nets such as the National Social Investment Programmes are not meeting desired targets or groups (Onah and Olise, 2020)? The point been reiterated is that poverty alleviation programmes or social safety nets need to be redesigned in a way that addresses growing poverty and growing misery. Nigeria and South Africa as leading figures on the continent cannot continue to be home to majority of Africa's poor persons. When growing poverty is reduced considerably, it would not only serve as springboard to actualize their hegemonic interests, but also serve as models for other states on the continent who are also faced with similar but daunting challenges.

Another key indicator of growth and development are the number of out of school children. According to figures obtained from United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 2018, there are 264 million out of school children globally. Out of this, 60 million are in sub-Saharan Africa with Nigeria alone accounting for 13.2 million out of the number representing 39.4% of the total. The number of out of school children that accrue to Nigeria alone in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa is a sign of looming danger especially against the backdrop of Nigeria's increasing security challenges which continue to claim lives with reckless abandon. With Nigeria having more out of school children than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa vis-a-vis South Africa which has a school enrolment put at 98% (Lesley-Anne, 2018), the future is bleak for Nigeria. Despite a 26% recommendation of annual budget to be allocated to education according to UNESCO, the Nigerian budget since 1999 have not allocated up to 10% to education every year, a situation responsible for the dismal performance in key performance index as reflected by number of out of school children at the elementary level. Comparatively, South Africa's performance index in this area is laudable going by its functional elementary school system which guarantees the enrolment and retention of all aged school children in school. The investment of the South African government in this regard is akin to the functional educational system which is now a source of attraction to many Nigerian students and scholars, who find the South African environment more conducive for teaching and research.

LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE CONTRADICTION

The lessons drawn from this paper is that over the past two decades is that South Africa has closed the gap and even surpassing Nigeria in some key areas of development. Over this period, South Africa has shown the rest of the world it is ready for leadership position through its commitment to the growth and development of Africa. While it may not have achieved all its potentials, it is no doubt a pace setter in Africa, hence the appellation 'Europe in Africa' going by developments in the area of infrastructure, science and technology, agriculture and allied products; food security among other key performance indicators. This justifies the good rating and ranking of South Africa as a country ready to lead the rest of the continent.

The giant strides of South Africa which resulted in her subtle recognition over other African countries including Nigeria is made more visible through her membership of multilateral organisations namely G20, IBSA, and BRICS among others. The recognition has resulted in incessant diplomatic face-off with Nigeria, a country traditionally acknowledged as the giant of Africa. Whatever arguments

are made in favour of Nigeria or South Africa's claiming the leadership title in Africa, this paper expressly submits that the leadership void in Africa be filled. Going by the appellation of leadership conferred on South Africa in Africa, the onus is on Nigeria to turn the tide against South Africa to either reclaim the position or simply accept the statusquo ante. As nations' across the globe grapple with issues of leadership in their respective continents to solve peculiar problems, Africa's leading states have also vied for leadership position, a position which has been claimed by South Africa. The lesson from this is that South Africa's possesses the attributes and qualities needed of a leader to meet the requirements of the twenty first century. It is worthy of note that South Africa's ascension is not determined by her seeming preference by international actors but largely due to her capacity to transform most of its manifest potentials to strengths. This has put her ahead of her contemporaries in Africa who were once considered as the leader of the continent or those who still nurse leadership position.

CONCLUSION

Essentially, the gap between performance and failure is a function of how well manifest potentials have been transformed into capacity, competency and ability. How manifest potentials are transformed to strengths is entirely up to states as they seek to gain local acceptance and influence and gain international recognition. The ability to transform potentials to performance would not only project the image of a state positively before the international community, but also serve as a viable recipe for establishing sustainable foreign relations with key actors in the international system. In the event that a state cannot transform its potentials to strength, such a state is not only perceived as a parasite before the international community, but may become isolated by others. To this end, this paper concludes that the competency of South Africa to transform more of its potentials into strengths has earned her more accolades and recognition not only by her neighbours on the continent, but by members of the international community.

Nigeria on the other hand relatively remains a country of potentials whose manifest destiny to lead the continent has not been fully developed. Part of what has worked against Nigeria has been the failure of leadership to come up clear-cut approaches and strategies to transform these potentials to strengths. Though, Nigeria has all the qualities to emerge as Africa's undisputed leader, certain internal contradictions including growing poverty, highest number of out of school children, low value of Naira, low minimum wage, decrepit and moribund infrastructure among others make this impossible. After 60 years of independence, it remains a sleeping giant and a country of the future. In concluding, Africa's desire for growth and qualitative leadership is not questionable, as current events require the right type of leadership that

can catapult the whole of the continent to meet the challenges of the twenty first century. To achieve this, Africa needs a country that has demonstrated capacity within to provide the much needed leadership for the continent as a whole. From all available criteria, it can be seen that South Africa seems to meet both criteria so it may be worth considering her as the leader of the continent for now going by the prevailing conditions, regardless of the competition taking place in the background.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

Adebajo A (2006). Prophets of Africa's renaissance: Nigeria and South Africa as regional hegemons (No. 3). Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

Adekunle T (2018). U.S Secretary of state, Tillerson, visits Nigeria on Monday. Available at: https://www.vanguardngr.com

Adetunji OA (2018). Nigeria-South Africa Diplomatic struggle for African Hegemony (1994-2017). Unpublished PhD Thesis, Babcock University, Ogun State, Nigeria.

Adewumi EF (2015). Nigeria's Security Challenges and Foreign Relations 1999-2012. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Babcock University, Ogun State, Nigeria.

Akinboye SO (2005). From Confrontation to Strategic Partnership: Nigeria's Relations with South Africa, 1960-2000. In: Ogwu UJ, (ed.), New Horizons for Nigeria in World Affairs (211-230). Nigeria Institute of International Affairs.

Akinboye SO (2007). Nigeria's National Interests and her Diplomatic relations with South Africa. In Akinterinwa BA (ed.) Nigeria's National Interests in a Globalising World: Further Reflections on Constructive and Beneficial Concentricism (300-356) Vol III. Bolytag International Publishers.

Akinkuotu E (2019). Over 91 Million Nigerians now desperately poor, says World Poverty Clock. Available at: www.punchng.com

Aribisala F (2013). A Permanent Seat for Nigeria in the United Nations Security Council. Financial Nigeria pp. 8-10.

Asemota A (2019). "8 Years After, 34 States yet to domesticate FOI Act". The Leadership Newspaper.

Bach DC (2007). Nigeria's "Manifest Destiny" in West Africa: Dominance without power. Afrika Spectrum 42(2):301-321.BBC News (2018). South African ex-President Jacob Zuma charged with corruption. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world/africa-43658953 on July 18, 2020

BBC News (2018) Jacob Zuma: Former South African president faces corruption trial. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43426971

Channels Television (2018). Analysis of Power Supply in Nigeria. Available at: www.channelstv.com

Cooksey K (2008). Thabo Mbeki to step down as South African president after ANC request. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/28/20/southafrica1

Department of Trade and Industry–DTI (2016). Trade, Exports and Investment. Available at: www.thedti.gov.za/trade_investement/trade_investment

Ebegbulem JC (2013). An Evaluation of Nigerian-South African bilateral relations. Journal of International relations and Foreign Policy 1(1):32-40.

Ekwowusi S (2019). Nigeria: Human Rights Violations in Nigeria. Thisday. Available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/201912110595.html

eNCA (2018). Ramaphosa meets German President in State Visit to South AFRICA. Available at: www.enca.com on

Enikanolaiye S (2013). Nigeria's African Policy: An Overview (II) Thisday.

Eskom (2018). Generating Electricity. Available at: www.eskom.co.za

Hanson K, Beisner RL (2003). American Foreign Relations since 1600: A guide to the Literature, 2nd Edition, ABC – CLIO.

Ikime O (1980). Groundwork of Nigerian History. Heinemann Educational Books

Jacobs P, Ngcobo N, Hart T, Baipheti M (2010). Overcoming Inequality and structural poverty in South Africa: Towards Inclusive growth and development. Being a conference paper delivered at O.R. Tambo conference centre, Jo'burg 20-22, Sept 2010.

Katz A (2015). All the U.S Presidents trips to Africa, Mapped. The Washington post. Available at: www.washingtonpost.com

Kazeem Y (2018). Emmanuel Macron's Unconventional visit to Nigeria was low on policy but high culture. Quartz Africa.

Kolawole Y, Emmanuel P (2018). GEEP: BOI disburse 15 billion loans to 400,000 micro–enterprises. Available at: www.vanguardngr.com

Koyo K (2019). Oxfam Report: 30.4 Million South Africans live in poverty. Available at: www.iol.coz.za

Lesley-Anne J (2018). 98% of South African Children attend school and other facts about access to education from the 2018 Gauge Report. Available at: www.parent24.com

McCrisken TB (2002). Exceptionalism. Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy 2:63-80.

National Social Investment Programme N-SIP (2020). National Social Investment Programme Available at: https://n-sip.gov.ng

Nwoke U (2019). Access to Information under the Nigerian Freedom of Information Act, 2011: Challenges to Implementation and the Rhetoric of Radical Change. Journal of African Law 63(3):435-461.

Nwosu N (2014). Arms deal: Why Nigeria resorted to Black Market Option. Thisday.

Nwosu O, Ugwuerua E (2014). Analysis and Reinvestment Programme (SURE-P) and Youth Empowerment in Nigeria 2012-2014. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science 19(12):25-32.

Obia V, Enumah A (2018). Theresa may visits Nigeria Tomorrow as trade with Britain grows. Thisday.

Ogunnubi O (2017). Effective hegemonic influence in Africa: An analysis of Nigeria's 'hegemonic' position. Journal of Asian and African Studies 52(7):932-946.

Okogba E (2018). Social intervention programme: FG feeds 8.7 million school children. Available at: www.vanguardngr.com

Okolo B (2006). Love/Hate Relationship between Nigeria and South Africa. Africa's International Relations University.

Onah R, Olise C (2020). National Social Investment Programme (N-SIP) and Sustainable Poverty Reduction in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 24(10):20-31.

Ramachandran J (2015). G20 Finance Ministers committed to sustainable Development Inter Press Service News Agency. Available at: www.ipsnews.net/2015/09/g20-fianance-ministers-committed-to-sustainable-development/

Routman B, Taiwo O (2011). Resolving the Crisis in Ivory Coast: The Role of Regional Organizations. Available at: www.brokkings.edu

Saliu HA (2009). Infrastructure and Foreign Policy. A focus on Nigeria. Nigerian forum: A Journal of Opinion on World Affairs 30(11,12):347-360.

Tella O (2019). Internal, Regional and External Impediments to Nigeria and South Africa's Hegemonic Competence in Africa. In: Tella O (ed.) Nigeria-South Africa Relations and Regional Hegemonic Competence. Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development. (3-23) Springer, Cham. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00081-3_1

Tetenyi A (2014). South Africa vs. Nigeria: Competing Countries for leadership position in Sub-Saharan Africa. Paper presented at the ISA/FLASCO conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 24th August, 2014.

Tijani A (2019). Nigeria is Violating Constitution on the El-Zakzaky and Dasuki cases. African Liberty. Available at: https://www.africanliberty.org/2019/07/22/nigeria-is-killing-its-constitution-on-the-el-zakzaky-and-dasuki-cases/

Transparency International (2018). Corruption Perception Index 2018. Available at: www.transparency.org

United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) (2018) Number of out of school children. Available at: www.unesco.org/number

Wapmuk S (2010). Nigeria-South Africa's relations, 1960-2008. In: Ashafa AM (ed.) Challenges for Nigeria at 50: Essays in honour of Professor Abdullahi Mahadi (551-563). GK Press limited.

Xinhua (2018). President's Xi arrives in South Africa for state visit. China Daily. Available at: www.chinadaily.com.cn

Zabadi IS, Onuoha FC (2012). Nigeria and South Africa: Competition or Cooperation. In: Imobighe TA, Alli WO (eds.), Perspectives on Nigeria's National Politics and External Relations: Essays in Honour of Professor A. Bolaji Akinyemi (384-408). University Press Ltd.

ACADEMIC JOURNALS
expand your knowledge

African Journal of Political Science and International Relations

Full Length Research Paper

Globalisation and COVID-2019 pandemic: The nexus and impact on development in Africa

Monday E. Dickson

Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Akwa Ibom State University, Obio Akpa Campus, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria.

Since the dawn of the 21st century, which coincides with the renewed forces of globalisation, the world has witnessed outbreak of major pandemics with coronavirus disease (COVID-19) as the most recent. This study therefore, examines the relationship between globalisation and COVID-19 pandemic as well as impact on development in Africa. The paper adopts the descriptive and analytical methods while purposive sampling technique, with twenty (20) countries (with the highest population growth) representing one third of African states were selected for the study. Five countries, one each from the five sub-regions of the continent with high incidences of coronavirus were analysed using the narrative analysis technique. Findings from the study revealed that: The spread of the pandemic has been very unusual as it takes the advantage of forces of contemporary globalisation. Consequently, several measures adopted by national governments to contain the transmission of the disease have created major economic shocks resulting to retardation in key economic sectors in many African countries. This has had far reaching consequences on Africa's growth as a dependent economy. While countries across the globe hasten to reinforce measures to contain the ailment, new measures for stimulating African economies and discouraging its reliance on external support must be adopted. Moreover, critical sectors of the economy must be reinvigorated.

Key words: Globalisation, global pandemics, Covid-19, lockdown, Africa, development.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, the world has experienced global and great pandemics, which have resulted in significant death tools as well as major disruption in nearly all facets of life. In other words, there have been major influenza outbreaks that have led to relative incidence of diseases and death of persons in the past nine or ten decades (Sritharan and Sritharan, 2020). Example is the notorious "Spanish influenza pandemic" (also known as "Spanish flu") of 1918-19, which erupted at the close of World War

II and spread rapidly across the globe with explosive impact. Cited as one of the most devastating in recorded history, the pandemic, among other things, resulted in double-digit losses in businesses, decrease in revenue, increase in prices of specialised health care products, shortage of labour that resulted in higher wages for workers and overall severance of economic activities in many countries. This also led to the death of more than 40 to 50 million people worldwide (Arnold, 2018). So far,

the Spanish flu is generally believed to have been the most lethal outbreak of diseases in the history of the world (Gasparini et al., 2012).

Afterwards, two other known health crises - the "Asian flu" and the "Hong Kong flu," with increased illness, death and disruption in the countries took place (Kilbourne, 2006; Akin and Gözel, 2020). The *Asian influenza* which broke out in Yunan, China in early 1957 and later spread across many nations and regions of the globe attacked mostly school children, young adults, pregnant women and elderly with estimated four million deaths worldwide (Potter, 2001; WHO, 2009). Further report has it that by early 1958, people estimated not less than 9 million in Great Britain were already infected by the epidemic. Of these, more than five million five hundred thousand index cases were recorded and about fourteen thousand people died owing to the immediate effects of the attack. Curiously, not only was huge financial resources spent by the government of various nations to contain the sickness, but factories, offices and mines closed to the economy suffered the worst hit – with setback in production leading to recession (Jackson, 2009).

Similarly, the *influenza* recorded for the first time in early July, 1968 and lasted for a year infected more than five hundred thousand Hong Kong residents in the first six months and later spread globally (Starling, 2006; Jackson et al., 2010). Similarly, Baldwin and Mauro (2020:6) submitted that "the virus had spread swiftly through the United States, United Kingdom and countries in Western Europe leading to about thirty-three thousand eight hundred American deaths while over one million people most of them over sixty-five years old died worldwide." Of note, the *Asian* and *Hong Kong influenzas* also had strong global economic impacts and contributed to short-lived recessions (Capital Partners, 2020).

As the world enters the 21st century, the outbreak of several dreaded diseases became source of concern to the world. However, Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) represented the first new viral pandemic that wreaked havoc on many countries in recent past. Beginning mysteriously in Southern China in November 2002, the pandemic spread across about thirty-three countries on five continents and infected over eight thousand people while seven hundred and seventy-four persons died. Obviously, SARS was brought under control in 2004 after creating global economic shock (Guan et al., 2003; Oldstone, 2010). In a similar vein, MERS, which was discovered for the first time in Saudi Arabia in 2012 had two thousand two hundred and seventy-nine confirmed cases of human infections in twenty-seven countries with eight hundred and six (35%) deaths as of early February, 2019 (Butler, 2012; Mubarak et al., 2019). Several studies revealed that SARS and MERS were caused by a member of the coronavirus family, hence, the virus's full abbreviations, SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV (Lai et al., 2007). Thus, the last one hundred years have been marked by successive and unanticipated pandemics (Honigsbaum, 2019; Baldwin and Mauro, 2020), a development which has implications for African states.

As the year 2019 drew to a close, the world experienced a new infectious disease known as COVID-19 currently spreading speedily through the world. Although the hub of the outbreak was initially Wuhan, high numbers of index cases have been reported in many other countries and regions of the world with Africa as the most affected continent. It has been argued that the spread of COVID-19 throughout the global population is, primarily due to the movement of people across countries of the world (Sritharan and Sritharan, 2020). Pertinent questions, therefore, are: What is the relationship between globalisation and the spread of coronavirus disease? What are the impacts of the pandemic on Africa's development? How may the torrent and exceptionally high effect of COVID-19 be checked?

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES

Conceptual framework

The name *corona* comes from the Latin word, meaning "crown," owing to the spiky fringe which encircle these viruses (Osler, 2020). Therefore, *corona* refers to "the crown like appearance of coronavirus, a circular core with spike-like projections of the surrounding glycol-proteins" (Oldstone, 2010:227).

In the view of Sauer (2020), coronaviruses are important human and animal pathogens that have caused a worldwide disease and affect an exceptionally high proportion of the population with COVID-19 as prominent examples. Consequently, Sauer (2020) and Maragaski (2020), among other authorities, have identified dried cough, fever, shortness of breath or difficulty in breathing, nausea or vomiting and congestion or runny nose as symptoms of the sickness.

Similarly, it has a zoonotic origin, meaning that coronaviruses are normally transmitted between animals and people (Ye et al., 2020). As such, two main routes of the infection are: direct contact with object that has the virus on it, and indirect contact - by inhaling droplets emitted through sneezes and cough (Ningthoujam, 2020). For that reason, researchers are of the opinion that COVID-19 is transmitted through droplets released into the air when an infected person coughs or sneezes (Dhan and Li, 2020). The droplets generally do not travel more than a few feet, and they fall to the ground (or onto surfaces) in a few seconds (Holdeman, 2020; Sauer, 2020; Lanese, 2020).

Theoretical building blocks

The spread of global pandemics such as COVID-19 as

well as its impact on Africa could be explained within the prism of globalism. Accordingly, globalisation theories provide the frames for analysing the phenomena under study. It is quite apposite to state from the outset that globalisation is a complex and multi-faceted set of processes having diverse meaning as well as broad influence on human societies, natural environments etc. (Saker et al., 2004; Anumba, 2014). These complexities notwithstanding, contemporary globalisation, have to do largely with the forces or processes that involve the entire world and result in making something (in this case, the outbreak and spread of COVID-19) worldwide in scope. Being the latest wave of globalisation, it is characterised by growing interconnectedness of different parts of the world through common processes of economic, environmental, political and cultural integration driven by technological development (UK Essays, 2018).

Consequently, four fundamental pillars of contemporary globalisation have been identified by Wattimena (2018). The first pillar is internationalisation, which can be seen and measured empirically through the intensive cross border interactions between nations and the global movement of people, goods and services. The second pillar is interdependence, which actually is the nature of natural and social reality. Interdependence is a principle that explains the inherent relation of everything that exists in reality. The third pillar is westernisation, namely the tendency of contemporary globalisation to spread American and European values to the various parts of the world at the expense of existing local cultures. The fourth pillar is the rise of global consciousness that creates the world society. It brings the feeling of global solidarity through communication, as well as awareness of the existing global challenges, such as environmental problems, disease and global inequality. Therefore, globalisation changes the nature of human interaction across a wide range of spheres, thereby undermining boundaries of various kinds (Lee, 2003). This has manifested in three dimensions: spatial, temporal and cognitive. The *spatial dimension* is perhaps the most readily acknowledged aspect of globalisation through its redefining of the geographical boundaries that circumscribe peoples' interactions with one another (Lee, 2003).

Undoubtedly, as Scholte (1997) notes, the vision of 'global village' increasingly brought people together by commonalities of experience, lifestyle, values and aspirations. Thus, global village implies a shared fate from forces that readily cross territorial space to affect lives. That is, trans-border flows of people, goods and services, knowledge and ideas, environmental change and so on (Lee, 2003). Environmentally, the world has become an interdependent and internationalised system where a mal-function of one part can lead to disasters throughout the system. For instance, the outbreak of SARS in China in 2002, spread rapidly around the world and became a worldwide health threat (Huang, 2004).

Besides, the *temporal dimension* concerns how people perceive and experience time. The changing time frame of many types of social interaction are therefore, closely linked to the spatial dimension. In many ways, speed at which people live their lives is accelerating. Acceleration of a wide range of social processes constitutes primary mode of experience in contemporary society (Rosa, 2013). Therefore, these global changes and speed at which people live their lives has far-reaching implications for human health, particularly during outbreak and spread of pandemics.

Despite the fact that globalisation affects health in myriad of ways, the *cognitive dimension* focuses specifically on how globalisation influences the way people imagine, which is equally relevant for understanding health impacts. In other words, people thinking about the alarming rate of people who have passed away globally due to the virus and the number of people losing jobs or income during the lockdown. Thus, what people think, and hence what they and others do to affect their health, has been continually shaped by the environment around them. As the nature of environment becomes increasingly global, so too are the influences on people's thought processes.

Corroborating these viewpoints, Saker et al. (2004: 1) assert that processes of globalisation impact directly or indirectly on health at a number of different levels. Thus, globalisation, which made free movement of people from different cities, countries, and continents possible, is the main enabler of the spread of COVID-19 around the world (Kitenge, 2020). Globalisation has made it easier for people to travel by land, sea, and air from one part of the world to another.

METHODOLOGY

The researcher adopts the descriptive and analytical methods for the study. The descriptive approach explores and undertakes a vivid description of the outbreak, expansion and the state of COVID-19 as it exists at present; while the analytical method utilizes facts or information already available for the critical evaluation of the impact of the pandemics. Thus, data for the study were gathered largely from the documentary evidence. Purposive sampling technique was deployed to select twenty countries (with the highest population growth) representing one-third of African states for the study while five countries, one each from the five regions or sub-regions of the continent with high incidences of coronavirus were analysed. Moreover, useful information on the relationship between globalisation and the unprecedented spread of COVID-19 epidemic was extracted from responses and other research materials to determine the impact on Africa.

The evolution and spread of COVID-19 pandemic

Although the evolution, expansion and effects of health pandemic spanned over a century, coronavirus first appeared in 1931 with the first HCoV-229E isolated from human in 1965 (Vassilara et al., 2018; Korsman et al., 2012). However, SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, which occurred in late 2002 and 2012 respectively, are the two major communicable and pathogenic viruses that came up in

Table 1. Cases of COVID-19 in African Countries with the biggest population as of October 2, 2020.

Country	Estimated population (in million)	Number of confirmed cases	Percentage of cumulated cases in the region	Number of death	Recoveries	Number of active cases
Nigeria	206 140	59, 001	4.99	1, 112	48, 569	7, 439
Ethiopia	114 964	76,098	6.43	1,204	28,314	43,517
Egypt	102 334	103,317	8.75	5,946	96,855	12, 932
DR Congo	89 561	10,685	0.9	272	9,930	247
South Africa	59 309	676,084	57.12	16,866	590.071	49,364
Kenya	53 771	38,713	3.27	718	23,887	12,972
Uganda	45 741	8,287	0.7	75	2,616	3,739
Algeria	43 851	51,690	4.37	1,741	35,047	13,667
Sudan	43 849	10,992	0.9	836	5,700	1,191
Morocco	36 911	128,565.	9.7	2,263	106,044	20,258
Angola	32 866	5,144	0.43	185	1,445	2,847
Mozambique	31 225	8,888	0.75	62	3,622	3,253
Ghana	31 073	46,656	3.74	301	45,153	413
Madagascar	27 691	16,454	1.39	232	14,646	792
Cameroon	26 546	26,838	1.76	418	19,385	901
Côte d'Ivoire	26 378	19,793	1.2	120	19,320	5,088
Niger	24 207	1,197	0.1	69	1.104	14
Burkina Faso	20 903	2,056	0.17	58	1,176	663
Mali	20 251	3,131	0.26	131	2,372	540
Senegal	**16 743**	15,019	1.27	311	11,260	2,170

Source: Varrella (2020); Figure on COVID-19 is compiled by the author.

humans in recent years (Cui et al., 2019). In early December 2019, an outbreak of unexplained or unknown *aetiology pneumonia,* with cases clustered around Wuhan's Huanan Seafood Market, China was reported. The cases were observed a week after and the cluster was first identified on December 31st, 2019 (World Health Organization, 2020). Consequently, the outbreak of suspected pandemic was first alerted to World Health Organization by the Chinese authorities. As a result, the market was immediately shut down while coronavirus disease was officially detected by the government (Osler, 2020).

Over the past months, the novel COVID-19 has continued to spread across many countries and continents of the world with millions of confirmed cases and deaths (Huang et al., 2020). Advancing reasons for the unprecedented expansion and cataclysmic effects of the pandemic, Osler (2020: 5) posits that, "the virus spread rapidly because it began in an emerging business and transport hub of China." According to Osler, Wuhan is a hard place and has approximately eleven million people, more than the City of New York with about three thousand five hundred passengers taking direct flights from it to many cities in other countries per day. As a result, those cities were among the first to experience COVID-19 outbreak. Furthermore, the movement of large number of migrant workers from China to Africa where Belt and Road Initiative is making a huge infrastructure drive has become veritable tool for spreading COVID-19 (Serrano-Moreno et al., 2020).

The land transportation and air travels which aided movement of people, goods, and services pose high risk in African states. It has helped in spreading of epidemic to countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar and Zimbabwe and so on. As of August 30, 2020 the region officially has about six million and two hundred thousand confirmed cases and two hundred and one thousand deaths, surpassing the United States with about six million cases and one hundred and eighty-six thousand deaths. Statistics show that Brazil, the continent's largest and most populous country has the largest outbreak with more than three million nine hundred thousand confirmed cases and over one hundred and twenty-one thousand deaths as of September 1, 2020 (Andreoni, 2020). As of September 7, 2020 Peru, the region's second-most affected country recorded a total six hundred and eighty-nine thousand nine hundred and seventy-seven cases, with twenty-nine thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight deaths and five hundred and fifteen thousand and thirty-nine recoveries. As a result, many of the nation's poorest residents are forced to violate government-imposed quarantine measures and curfews in order to buy food for the day or access government stimulus benefits (Ward, 2020; Worldometer, 2020). The spread of COVID-19 is accelerating across the world. In all continents and regions of the world, most countries have confirmed cases, recoveries and the number of fatalities is rising astronomically. As the pandemic continue to spread, as shown in Table 1, the impact on African countries, its citizens and economies are becoming substantial.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Thirty-six (36) weeks after its outbreak, the pandemic has turned into a major disease affecting millions of people around the world regardless of their geographical location. The high rate of spread has been attributed to technological application and initiatives which are the main forces of globalization. This has made it easier for people to travel by land, sea and even air with goods

from one part to the other without facing any obstacles, thereby spreading the deadliest disease. Figures published by Coronavirus Resource Centre, Johns Hopkins University as of October 2, 2020 recorded a total of 34,582,924 confirmed cases, 1,027,823 deaths and 20,344,383 recoveries globally. Similarly, updates from WHO Regional Office for Africa show that 1,183,552 confirmed cases; 993, 260 recoveries, 26, 090 deaths and 164,201 active cases have been recorded within the African continent. Table 1 is the highlight of index cases of the pandemic among selected African countries.

From the above, it is obvious that Nigeria has the largest population in Africa followed by Ethiopia, Egypt, DR Congo, South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda. However, South Africa recorded the highest number of confirmed cases representing 57.12% of the number of cumulated cases in the African region within the period under review. The country also tops the chat in the number of death, recoveries and active cases. This is followed by Morocco (9.7%), Egypt (8.75%), Ethiopia (6.43%) and Nigeria (4.99%) of cumulated cases. Mwai and Giles (2020) maintained that Morocco has been experiencing a sustained increase in new cases and has had the highest number of infected persons over the past period.

High incidences of coronavirus in Africa have been attributed to a number of factors including the continent's top trading relationship with Beijing the country where COVID-19 originated (Vaughan, 2020). The country is currently Africa's largest trading partner with significant investments in manufacturing, construction, energy, mining, and telecommunications railways, ports, airports, hospitals, schools, and stadiums and service sectors in the Africa. As a result of these, there is expanded market for Chinese consumer goods and services through importation. Affirming the above scenario, Gilbert et al. (2020) point out that while some Southern and Northern Africa countries were at highest importation risk from China, countries at moderate risk, particularly those in Western region have variable capacity and high vulnerability. In other words, the near-term driver of COVID-19 risk in Africa is owing to the flow of consumer goods services and travellers from Western Europe to the continent.

The second reason is that in an attempt to fight COVID-19, many African countries have adopted some international policy trends such as border closures, travel restrictions, strict migration measures, imposition of quarantines, and enforcement of stay-at-home orders (Nantulya and Mavhinga, 2020). Furthermore, measures such as national lockdown and many strict mitigation actions taken by governments within and outside Africa to limit gatherings and the mobility of people as a way to curb the spread of the virus have had severe consequences on economic activities. This has led to shocks with resultant retardation in key economic sectors such as tourism, air transportation, manufacturing industries, and trade (Kitenge, 2020). Consequently,

most countries across the continent have been economically affected by the paralysis of essential economic sectors.

For instance, Nigeria's economy has virtually collapsed owing to its dependence on oil exports. The oil markets have been on a downward trend as COVID-19 has crippled demand. Fuel prices fell and recorded 18-year low trading at less than 22 dollars per barrel (Omilana, 2020). Apparently, the Nigerian government can no longer meet the targeted demand of crude oil benchmark of $57 per barrel to fund the 2020 budget as the fall in crude price has made it to reduce the benchmark to $30, a gap of 27 Naira, which is a deficit, aside from slashing 1.5 trillion Naira in order to make the budget realistic (Ayoade, 2020).

Similarly, the pandemic has affected the economy of South Africa in significant ways. Before outbreak, South African economic growth had been an engine of hope in sub-region. Results based on panel data estimation for forty-seven African countries over four decades suggest that the country's economic growth has had substantial positive impacts on the rest of Africa countries (Arora and Vamvakidis, 2005). However, the outbreak of the pandemic and lockdown measures adopted by the government has profound implications on its economy. Specifically, the demand for South Africa's export has reduced drastically resulting in a GDP decline (Arndt et al., 2020).

Thus, the effect on GDP has been significant – with a projected recession and severe contraction of the economy, accompanied by big job losses, firm closures and high levels of social hardship. Internally, market sectors most disadvantaged by the COVID-19 outbreak include textiles, tourism, beverages, tobacco, glass products, and footwear. Small and medium enterprises are most negatively impacted (UNDP Report, 2020). Ethiopia was struggling with a large-scale desert locust invasion affecting close to one million people before the sickness struck. There were equally reports of scant rant disrupting the agricultural sector and leading to high levels of food insecurity, outbreaks of cholera, measles, and yellow fever - straining a health service which readiness to deliver routine health services was rated very high in 2018 (UN Assessment Report, 2020). Therefore, the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic poses threats to Ethiopia's reforms and relatively strong economic growth, with "wide-ranging and serious" consequences across the nation.

As Alemayehou (2020) puts it, Ethiopian debt burden, foreign exchange woes stemming from poor sector performance and a decline in remittances constitute major challenge. She observed further that owing to the pandemic, the country's foreign exchange is weak and poses a significant near-term challenge to its economy. Already, the exchange rate has fallen due largely to poor-performing sectors, particularly its national airline, agricultural exports, hospitality sector, and production

targets. Thus, the economic consequences of the pandemic in Ethiopia appear to be more protracted than health-related repercussions.

In recent years, Egypt has been a rising nation among emerging economies. Its vital socio-economic sectors had experienced economic growth and increased stability with the tourism sector recording highest revenues. Expectedly, efforts aimed at improving the countries business climate through several reforms were to ensure stronger private sector growth and economic diversification in 2020 and beyond (Breisinger et al., 2020). However, these attempts have been interrupted by the measures adopted to contain the spread of COVID-19. For instance, since international flights were suspended and travel restrictions imposed, tourism sector which is one of the important sources of revenue and employment opportunities for its citizens has halted almost completely (Suleiman, 2020). Furthermore, the slowdown in global economic activity has reduced drastically.

Tourism, Suez Canal, and remittances, which are important sources of employment, household income, foreign currency and government revenue have been halted. Disruptions to these foreign revenue sources are already having far-reaching implications for Egypt's economy and population. In the Central African sub-region, Morocco that had achieved significant social and economic progress due to large public investments, structural reforms, along with measures to ensure macroeconomic stability has been devastated by the outbreak of the pandemic and containment measures to deal with it. Notably, tourism which generates around five hundred thousand direct jobs (or two million five hundred thousand including indirect jobs), air transport and some exporting sectors (especially the textile and automotive sectors) have been impacted by shocks to both the demand and supply sides. In the tourism sector, restaurants and hotels are hit the hardest, with a drop of at least 25%. The number of arriving visitors dropped by hundreds of thousands while the port of TangerMed continues to experience 80% drop in revenues (OECD, 2020). The shock has, however, pushed the economy into a severe recession, the first one since 1995 (World Bank, 2020).

Altogether, African continent has suffered harmful effects of COVID-19 owing to its openness to foreign trade and migration. The continent's interconnectedness or direct trade links with China as well as the rapid spread of the virus in many African countries has led to a disruption in socio-economic activities. The measures used in the process of containing the transmission of the disease has created major economic shocks with retardation of key economic sectors such as tourism, air transportation, manufacturing industries and trade in many African countries. These have caused a decrease in domestic demand in tax revenue due to the loss of oil and commodity prices and an increased in public expenditure to safeguard human health and support economic activities.

Furthermore, the interruption in agricultural activities owing to the pandemic has led to losses of jobs by those involved in the sector. The unmanaged farms have produced fewer crops than usual leading to the decline in the GDP of countries whose economy is mostly agrarian. These repercussions in key economic sectors in Africa have had severe damage to the prosperity of its people and hinder the efforts to achieve the continental development blueprint. As from these critical areas, the educational sector appears to have been most greatly affected. The disease has resulted in total shutting of schools in about two hundred and fifteen countries globally with 91.4% of the total number of enrolled learners in these countries momentarily mandatory out of school (UNESCO, 2020).

In Africa, educational systems have been typically affected by the deadly disease as more than 98% of teaching and learning activities could not be carried out owing to the lockdown measures and implementation of social distancing which led to closure of schools across the continent. The pandemic has equally created political crisis in many countries. For instance, politicisation of the COVID-19 figures in some African countries in the hope of extorting financial resources either from international donor agencies or individual national governments by members of the management committees has impacted negatively on countries' progress. The implication is that in the process of managing the pandemic, the capabilities of the government and international donors are pushed to the extreme. Thus, the pressure to respond quickly to urgent demand has created opportunities for health research, development, procurement and delivery, particularly among African countries (Naval and MacLachlan, 2020).

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Currently, COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented health crisis distinct from any since World War II. It has created a ramifying public health, economic, and political crisis in many countries of the world. Outbreak and rapidity of spread of the virus is the most significant indication of what happens when there is uncontrolled expansion in movements and interactions of human beings, as well as exchange of goods and services. As a result, the pandemic has brought considerable suffering - unemployment, poverty, food insecurity etc. to vulnerable population across countries, regions and continents of the world. Several international and national measures adopted to contain the virus have led to rupture in relations between countries as well as deceleration in key sectors of the economy. Beyond health emergency, the COVID-19 crisis has created a historic global recession that primarily affects most countries of the globe. The

impact is greater on developing countries because of larger shocks and the relocation of international capital flows to major European and American countries.

In a globally connected society, coronavirus and its economic and social fallout has become everyone's problem. Therefore, increased government spending must first be directed at the health sector, supporting all necessary spending on prevention, containment and mitigation of the virus. New strategies for diversifying African economies and limiting its dependence on foreign goods and services as well as external patronage must be adopted. For instance, private-sector-driven diversification must be encouraged. Key steps include reviewing trade policies to remove bias against exporting, and ensuring effective competition in product markets and in key services such as transportation, energy and communications. Africa is endowed with abundant natural resources, including minerals, and revenues from their export constitute a major source of income for many countries. Therefore, diversification would lay a more solid foundation for accelerated development as economies weakened by lack of diversification are susceptible to global crises such as recession in times of pandemic.

Moreover, while countries hasten to reinforce measures to contain the spread of COVID-19, critical sectors of economy (such as agriculture, infrastructure, tourism and oil sector) must be stimulated in a more regionalised (continental) or autochthonous form. Coordinated approaches at regional integrations would strengthen the continents' capacity to act as globalisation agents through political and economic interactions among African countries – a key factor in overcoming dependence. Regional integration, especially in economic and health projects would help African countries jointly meet the challenges of COVID-19.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

Akin L, Gözel, MG (2020). Understanding dynamics of pandemics. Turkish Journal of Medical Sciences 50(SI-1):515-519.

Alemayehou M (2020). Ethiopia battles the pandemic and its economic consequences. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/ethiopia-battles-pandemic-and-its-economic-consequences.

Andreoni M (2020). Coronavirus in Brazil: what you need to know. The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/article/brazil-coronavirus-cases.html.

Anumba J (2014). The impact of globalization on public health and infectious diseases. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326175556

Arndt C, Davies R, Gabriel S, Harris L, Makrelov K, Modise B, Robinson S, Simbanegavi W, van Seventer D, Anderson L (2020). Impact of Covid-19 on the South African economy: an initial analysis. SA-TIED Working Paper 111. Available at: https://sa-tied.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/SA-TIED-WP-111.pdf.

Arnold C (2018). Pandemic 1918: Eyewitness Accounts from the Greatest Medical Holocaust in Modern History. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Arora V, Vamvakidis A (2005). The Implications of South African economic growth for the rest of Africa. IMF Working Paper No. 05/58. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1503160.

Ayoade O (2020). The economic repercussion of coronavirus pandemic on Nigerians. Pulitzer Centre. Available at: https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/economic-repercussion-coronavirus-pandemic-nigerians

Baldwin R, Mauro B (Eds), Economics in the Time of COVID-19. CEPR Press.

Breisinger C, Abdelatif A, Raouf M, Wiebelt M (2020). COVID-19 and the Egyptian economy: Estimating the impacts of expected reductions in tourism, Suez Canal revenues, and remittances. Regional Program Policy Note 04.

Butler D (2012). Clusters of coronavirus cases put scientists on alert. Nature: International Weekly Journal of Science 492 (7428):166-167.

Capital Partners (2020). The impact of pandemics on global financial markets. https://capital-partners.com.au/pandemics-and-global-financial-markets/.

Cui J, Li F, Shi Z (2019). Origin and evolution of pathogenic coronaviruses. Nature Reviews Microbiology 17:181-192.

Dhan R, Li J (2020). Coughs and Sneezes: Their Role in Transmission of Respiratory Viral Infections, Including SARS-CoV-2. American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 202(5):651-659. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7462404/

Gasparini R, Amicizia D, Lai PL, Panatto D (2012) Clinical and socioeconomic impact of seasonal and pandemic influenza in adults and the elderly. Human Vaccines and Immunotherapeutics 8(1):21-28.

Gilbert M, Pullano G, Pinotti F, Valdano E, Poletto C, Boëlle PY, D'Ortenzio E, Yazdanpanah Y, Eholie SP, Altmann M, Gutierrez B, Kraemer MUG, Colizza V (2020). Preparedness and vulnerability of African countries against importations of COVID-19: A modelling study. Lancet 395(10227):871-877.

Guan Y, Zheng BJ, He YQ, Liu XL, Zhuang ZX, Cheung CL, Luo SW, Li PH, Zhang LJ, Guan YJ, Butt KM, Wong KL, Chan KW, Lim W, Shortridge KF, Yuen KY, Peiris JSM, Poon LLM (2003). Isolation and characterization of viruses related to the SARS coronavirus from animals in Southern China. Science 302:276.

Holdeman E (2020). COVID-19: Transmission scenarios explained. Gt. government technology. Available at: https://www.govtech.com/em/emergency-blogs/disaster-zone/covid-19-transmission-.

Honigsbaum M (2019). The Pandemic Century: One Hundred Years of Panic, Hysteria, and New York: Hubris. W. W. Norton Company.

Huang Y (2004). The SARS epidemic and its aftermath in China: a political perspective." Learning from SARS: Preparing for the next disease outbreak (2004):116-36.

Huang Y, Yang C, Xu X, Xu W, Liu S (2020). Structural and functional properties of SARS-CoV-2 spike protein: potential antivirus drug development for COVID-19. Acta Pharmacologica Sinica 3:1-9.

Jackson C (2009). History lessons: The Asian Flu pandemic. British Journal of General Practice 59(565):622–623.

Jackson C, Vynnycky E, Mangtani P (2010). Estimates of the transmissibility of the 1968 (Hong Kong) Influenza pandemic: Evidence of increased transmissibility between successive waves. American Journal of Epidemiology 171(4):465-478.

Kilbourne ED (2006). Influenza pandemics of the 20th century. Emerging Infectious Diseases 12(1):9-14.

Kitenge SY (2020). Globalisation linkage to COVID-19: How Africa's economy is impacted? Africa Renewal. Available at: https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/coronavirus/globalisation-linkage-covid-19-how-africa%E2%80%99s-economy-impacted

Korsman SN, Zyl GU, Nutt L, Andersson MI, Preiser W (2012). Human coronaviruses. Virology 94-95. Churchill Livingstone.

Lai MC, Perlman S, Anderson LJ (2007). Coronaviridae. In. Knipe D et al. (eds.) Fields' Virology, 5th Edition. Philadelphia.

Lanese N (2020). COVID-19 may spread through breathing and talking - but we don't know how much. ProfMoosa.

https://www.livescience.com/covid19-coronavirus-transmission-through-speech.html.

Lee K (2003). Globalization and Health: An Introduction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Maragaski LL (2020). Coronavirus symptoms: Frequently asked questions. https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-anddiseases/coronavirus/.

Mubarak A, Alturaiki W, Hemida MG (2019). Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV): Infection, immunological response, and vaccine development. Journal of Immunology Research. https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/6491738.

Mwai P, Giles C (2020). Coronavirus: is the rate of growth in Africa slowing down? BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53181555.

Nantuly CK, Mavhinga D (2020). Africa's COVID-19 response should focus on people's needs. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/16/africas-COVID-19-response-should-focus-

Naval AM, MacLachlan K (2020). Defence sector corruption, an underestimated foe in times of crisis. Rusi. Available at: https://www.transparency.org.uk/defence-sector-corruption-underestimated-foe-crisis/

Ningthoujam R (2020). COVID 19 can spread through breathing, talking, study estimates. *Curr* Med Res Pract, 10(3), 132–133. Available at: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32391407/

OECD (2020). The Covid-19 crisis in Morocco. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. www.oecd.org.

Oldstone MB (2010). Viruses, Plagues, and History: Past, Present, and Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Omilana T (2020). Nigeria's revenue drops by almost 60% due to coronavirus, says Buhari. The Guardian Nigeria. https://guardian.ng/news/nigerias-revenue-drops-by-almost-60-due-to-coronavirus-says-buhari/

Osler S (2020). Coronavirus Outbreak: All the secrets revealed about the Covid-19 pandemic. A complete rational guide of its Evolution, Expansion, Symptoms and First Defense. A. B. Lawal Publishers

Potter CW (2001). A history of influenza. Journal of Applied Microbiology 91(4):572-579.

Rosa H (2013). Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity. Columbia: Columbia University Press.

Saker L, Lee K, Cannito B, Gilmore A, Campbell-Lendrum D (2004). Globalization and infectious diseases: A review of the linkages. UNICEF/UNDP/World   Bank/WHO. Special Topics No.3.

Sauer (2020). What is Coronavirus? John Hopkins Medicine. https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus.

Scholte JA (1997). The globalization of world politics. In. Baylis J, Smith S (eds.) The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. (pp. 13–   30). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Serrano-Moreno JE, Telias D, Urdinez F (2020). Deconstructing the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America. Asian Education and Development Studies.   https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-01-2020-0021

Sritharan J, Sritharan A (2020). Emerging mental health issues from the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. Journal of Health and Medical Sciences 2(2):157-162.

Starling AE (2006). Plague, SARS and the Story of Medicine in Hong Kong. Hong Kong University Press.

Suleiman HM (2020). Economic impact of COVID-19: Powerful shock to post-reform Egypt. https://www.euromesco.net/publication/economic-impact-of-.

UK Essays (2018). Impact of contemporary globalisation on Thailand. Available at: https://www.ukessays.com/essays/cultural-studies/what-is-contemporary-globalization-cultural-studies-essay.php?vref=1.

UN Assessment Report (2020). Socio-Economic impact of COVID‑ 19 in Ethiopia. Reliefwed. https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/socio-economic-impact-covid-19-ethiopia.

UNDP Report (2020). Socio-economic impact of COVID-19 in South Africa. United Nations Development Commission. https://www.za.undp.org/content/south_africa/en/home/library/

UNESCO (2020). COVID-19: a global crisis for teaching and learning. https://en.unesco.org/news/startling-digital-divides-distance-learning-emerge

Varrella S (2020). Population in Africa 2020, by country. Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1121246/population-in-africa-by-country/.

Vassilara F, Spyridaki A, Pothitos G, Deliveliotou , & Papadopoulos A (2018). A   rare case of human coronavirus 229E associated with acute respiratory distress syndrome in a healthy adult. https://www.hindawi.com/journals/criid/2018/6796839/.

Vaughan A (2020). We don't know why so few covid-19 cases have been reported in Africa. NewScientist. www.newscientist.com/article/2236760-

Ward A (2020). How South America became a coronavirus epicenter: Brazil, Peru, and Chile have made South America one of the world's worst Covid-19 hot spots. https://www.vox.com/2020/5/26/21270376/south-america-covid-19-coronavirus-brazil-peru-chile

Wattimena ZA (2018). What are the fundamental pillars of contemporary globalisation?   Ary Suta Centre Series on Strategic Management 42:1-18.

WHO Global Influenza Programme and World Health Organization. (2009) . Pandemic influenza preparedness and response: A WHO guidance document. https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44123.

World Bank (2020). Morocco economic monitor – Morocco's economic prospects and the COVID-19 crisis impact. https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/.

Worldometer (2020). Peru: Coronavirus cases. https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/peru/.

World Health Organozation (2020) Archived: WHO Timeline - COVID-19. https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19

Ye Z, Yuan S, Yuen K, Fung S, Chan C, and Jin D (2020). Zoonotic origins of human coronaviruses. International Journal of Biological Sciences 16(10):1686-1697.

AJ ACADEMIC JOURNALS
expand your knowledge

African Journal of Political Science and International Relations

Full Length Research Paper

The travails of Nigerian federalism 1951-1999: A federation in crisis of constitutional engineering

M. M. Fadakinte* and M. Abdulkareem

Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria.

Federalism in Nigeria dates back to 1951 (69 years), but in spite of the long period of experience with federalism as a political system, Nigerians are still in search of an acceptable, truly and functional federal constitution. Today, the clamor for the restructuring of the Nigerian federal system, another way of asking for a new constitution, is so rife that it has assumed a crisis proportion. This paper therefore briefly discusses some conceptual notes of federalism and summarizes the federal constitutions in Nigeria from 1951 till date. And finally, the paper adopts four perspectives in explaining the challenges of Nigerian federalism. The four perspectives are (1) the political economy of constitution making, (2) the nature of the Nigerian state, (3) the absence of hegemony and (4) the military factor.

Key words: Nigeria, federalism, constitutional engineering, political system.

INTRODUCTION

Federalism as a system of governance is pragmatic, dynamic, utilitarian and evolving representing a unique form of governmental arrangement in order to promote unity while at the same time preserving existing diversities within an overarching national entity (Wheare, 1963).

Nigeria was created in 1914 with the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates, when the British introduced a unitary system which lasted from 1914 to 1951. However, in 1951, Nigeria adopted a federal constitution that created three regions which were dominated by the three major ethnic groups, Yoruba in Western region, Igbo in Eastern region and Hausa-Fulani

in Northern region. However, it can be argued that although Nigeria has been practicing federalism since 1951, but by the 1999 constitution, the country is more a unitary than a federal system. This is indicated by how governmental functions and powers are shared between the central government and the component states.

Thus, out of the several political challenges that have confronted Nigeria, a critical one is the vexed and reoccurring issue of balancing the political structure of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by constitutional engineering.

Perhaps, with a very few exceptions it would appear that the predominant consensus is that Nigeria should be run as a federation in view of her heterogeneity and

*Corresponding author. E-mail: mmfadakinte@yahoo.com.

diversity. Consequently, since the inception of a federal constitution in 1951, Nigerians have been clamouring for a balanced federation, which was why the regions were increased from 3 in 1960 to 4 in 1962, and to 12 states in 1967, 19 states in 1976, 21 states in 1987, 30 states in 1991 and 36 states in 1996. Yet with 36 states the country's federal system is still regarded as unbalanced. Consequently, the agitations for more states have become phenomena, fueled by the fact that states are one of the factors taken into account in the distribution of national wealth. Thus, some communities who cannot achieve the desired pace of development within their existing state usually opt for the creation of a new state out of the existing state. Thus, as at 2009, requests for new states were up to 46 in number (Ojo, 2009), raising the question of whether the Federal Republic of Nigeria can ever achieve a balanced federal constitution.

Consequently, as the political fragmentation of the country continues, in terms of state creation, the Federal Government grows more in stature and becomes a *defacto* unitary state masquerading as a federation, which makes the following questions to be pertinent. One, what are the problems with crafting a balanced federal constitution for Nigeria? Two, when will constitutional engineering that will take account of Nigeria's unity in diversity, in search of a balanced federation end in Nigeria?

The crisis of constitutional engineering, the problem of continuous fragmentation of the country into states and the increased tendency to making Nigeria a unitary system with serious socio-political and economic consequences are the focus of this paper while the objective is to adopt four perspectives in explaining the problems with the preparation of a federal constitution that will be accepted by all the different ethnic groups in Nigeria. The four perspectives are: (1) the political economy of constitution making, (2) the nature of the Nigerian state, (3) the absence of hegemony and (4) the military factor.

Being a qualitative paper, it is analytical in nature on contemporary issues and challenges that confront the nation on the preparation of a federal constitution.

FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION: SOME CONCEPTUAL NOTES

Federalism is difficult to define and that is why there are today many versions of its definitions by different scholars. Wheare (1963) argues that a federal principle is the method of dividing power so that general and regional governments are each within a sphere, coordinate and independent.

The federal principles in Wheare's view will include the following characteristics:

(a) A division of power between different levels of governments, in the country
(b) A written constitution that entrenches division so that the constitution cannot be amended unilaterally by anyone or government acting alone.
(c) Each government is independent of the other level of government with regards to their respective functions;
(d) In the event of dispute between the federal and state government as to the extent of their powers some independent body other than the state or federal government will be authorized by the constitution to adjudicate on the dispute;
(e) Each level of government must have sufficient independent financial resources to liquidate its constitutional functions.
(f) In Wheare's view, financial subordination makes an end of federalism.

However, Wheare's (1963) argument is noted for its rigidity, and when strictly applied, will exclude all known federations. And that is because the degree of financial autonomy demanded in a federation by Wheare is virtually not maintainable given the shifting character of financial relation in a federation.

In his view, Livingstone (1956) stresses sociological perspective of federalism, by saying that for a federal arrangement there must exist a federal society. A federal society in his view is one with plurality of ethnic groups with different historical, cultural and linguistic backgrounds but in which each ethnic group occupies a marked and distinct geographical location from the others. According to him, the federal society derives from the cleavages between the diversified groups. It is the political, economic and social forces among these geographically grouped diversities that create the centripetal and centrifugal forces that formed the basis of federal society.

A federal constitution which is a legal document must, therefore, be distinguished from a federal society. In his view, it is the federal society that gives birth to the constitution. A federal constitution must embody the principle of division of powers, while a federal society is one with cleavages which are patterned along geographical lines. However, Livingstone argues that the social diversity which originally necessitates the creation of federal arrangement is constantly in a state of flux. The legal constitutions, he points out, affect and is affected by the societal diversities.

The sociological approach by Livingstone and the legal approach by Wheare are complimentary and not mutually exclusive. Each approach depicts an aspect of federalism from a separate disciplinary angle. The one approach does not exclude the other and an integrated application of both approaches opens a new dimension both to the formal and informal aspects of federalism.

According to Elaigwu (2005: 6), federalism is essentially a compromise solution in a multi-national government which guarantees security for all in the

nation-state on one hand and the self-determination of component groups to retain their individual identities on the other. It is therefore an attempt to satisfy "the need" for cooperation in some things coupled with right to separate action in orders (Ramphal, 1979). Watts (1970) argues that, what distinguishes federalism from a unitary government is that in a unitary government, states subordinate themselves to the central government. It also differs from confederacy in which the central government is legally subordinated to the component units.

Federalism, according to Jinadu (1979), is usually viewed as a form of governmental and institutional structure deliberately designed by political architects to cope with the twin but difficult task of maintaining unity while also preserving diversity.

Furthermore, it has been argued that in spite of the variety of meaning there is a remarkable similarity in an attempt by Anglo-Saxon writers to conceptualize federalism. In this respect, Wheare's formulation is perhaps, the most cogent and clearly expressed (Jinadu, 1979). Thus, Wheare's model, stresses formal institutional requirements such as, constitution, bicameral legislature, independent electoral system for both levels of government, multiparty, preferably two party system and supreme court (Jinadu, 1979).

Again, it has been argued that:

The dialect and disparity between the geographical confines of territorial states on the one hand and the boundaries of ethno-territorial communities on the other hand, seem to invite a federal solution. In federalism, we find a system of government that has been referred to as "the magic formula" for solving the governmental problems of multi-ethnic societies because as Mazrui point out; federalism is an institutionalization of compromise relationships (Duchacek, 1970: 255).

In view of the aforementioned, it is believed that in Nigeria, federalism should offer the best option to accommodate the ethno-linguistic and religious diversities, which were for the most part, geographically distributed.

From the aforementioned conceptual notes, it can be argued that, in a heterogeneous and multiethnic society like Nigeria, it is perhaps a well-structured federal system that can satisfy the desire for unity without tempering with and or destroying the identity of component units. Thus, federalism de-emphasizes concentration or centralization of power and that is precisely because, every constituent part will have its powers and functions clearly spelt out in the constitution.

A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA

The evolution and development of Nigerian is a reflection of the country primordial features of different indigenous societies in form of kingdoms and empires, with whom the British negotiated separate treaties. The diverse societies, diverse in terms of language, tradition, culture and values, therefore made a federal or confederal arrangement inevitable. However, until 1914, Nigeria existed as three entities, as Lagos colony and the northern and southern protectorates. It was in that year (1914) that Lord Lugard amalgamated the southern and northern protectorates and named the territory as Nigeria.

After the unification (amalgamation) in 1914, a new Nigeria and its continuous survival dominated the constitutional conferences and arraignments, beginning with the 1922 Clifford constitution. In 1943, Sir Arthur Richard having succeeded Sir Clifford as Governor General divided the country into three regions that were devoid of the principles of a federation. However, Awolowo (1947), while opposing the creation of only three regions, argued that there should be as many regions as there are ethnic groups in Nigeria and each region should be independent and autonomous, with regard to its internal affairs while each region must have its own regional house of assembly. Obafemi Awolowo's position was based on his argument that Nigeria is not a nation; it is a mere geographical expression.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

In 1900 the Southern Protectorate and the Colony of Lagos were merged under the title "The Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria." In the same year, a Legislative Council was created for the protectorate which was made up of British officials of government. And in 1914, the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, were amalgamated, and became one entity called Nigeria, under Lord Lugard as Governor-General.

The 1922 (Clifford) Constitution

The making of formal constitution in Nigeria, began in 1922 when a new constitution was promulgated by Governor Clifford, who revoked the 1914 constitution. The Clifford constitution created a Nigerian Legislative Council even though its jurisdiction was limited to the Southern Provinces, that is, the Colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and also established an Executive Council for the whole country. However, the governor continued to be the legislative authority for the Northern Protectorate (Ikime, 1980).

The 1946 (Richard) Constitution

In 1946, Governor Arthur Richards promulgated a new

constitution which came into effect on 1st January, 1946. Prior to this Nigeria had been divided into three regions in 1939, the Northern, Western and Eastern regions. However, the Regional Houses were not empowered to legislate, even for their own regions. They could only consider bills affecting their regions, and make recommendations or pass resolutions for the central legislature in Lagos to consider. It was the latter only that could pass legalization.

The 1922 and 1946 constitutions were unitary constitutions which technically mean that it was the 1951 constitution that can be referred to as the watershed in the production of federal constitution and in the process of creating/making Nigeria a federation.

The 1951 (MacPherson) Constitution

The 1951 Constitution, which went through an unprecedented process of consultation with the peoples of Nigeria, can be regarded as the first that attempted to draw up a federal constitution for Nigeria.

The following points need to be noted about the 1951 constitution as they form the nucleus of federalism in Nigeria. The new constitution represented a major advance on the existing state of legislative competence of Nigerians by (i) introducing elected majorities in the Central Legislature and (ii) in the Regional Houses of Assembly, (iii) endowing the Legislative Houses with independent legislative power in many areas of state activity, and (iv) establishing a Federal System for Nigeria for the first time.

However, the Macpherson constitution collapsed as a result of the threat of secession by the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the crisis in the Eastern Region house of assembly, the Kano riot and the 1953 motion by Anthony Enahoro, calling for Nigeria's independence in 1956.

The 1954 (Lyttleton) Constitution

In 1954, there was, for the first time, direct elections into the Federal Legislature and the office of Premier was created in the regions and the office of Prime Minister was established at the Centre in 1957. Subsequent changes were not fundamental, but merely in further preparation for full independence.

The Lyttleton constitution of 1954 failed because it did not address the fears of the minorities as the federal structure created by the constitution favored the major ethnic groups. Again, the regional structure that was established by the constitution helped to regionalized Nigerian politics, deepening ethnicity and national disunity. These shortcomings of the Lyttleton Constitution led to its collapse and replaced with a new constitution in 1959 as Nigeria prepare for independence in 1960.

The 1960 Independence and 1963 Republican Constitutions

By 1960, Nigeria was already a federation of three regions and a central government the arrangement that started with the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution.

However, major issues in the 1950 National Conference, at which occasion the practice of fiscal federalism was particularly emphasized, reflected in other conferences in 1953, 1954, 1957 and 1959. It can thus be argued that the period of 1950 to 1959 (9-years), was a period of negotiations between the political elites in the Nigeria.

Under the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions, the federal system was made up of strong regions and a central government with limited powers. Both the 1960 (Independence) and the 1963 (Republican) Constitutions were almost the same. The only differences were the provisions for ceremonial President (1963) in place of the Queen of England (1960) and the judicial appeals system which terminated with the Supreme Court (1963) rather than the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council (1960). In other words, the 1960 constitution articulated federal principles for Nigeria by creating autonomous regions and a centre with each having its own well defined powers.

However, one of the most notable effects of the pre-independent constitutions, especially from that of 1951, was that political parties became ethnic based.

The 1979 Presidential Constitution

In July 1975, General Murtala Muhammed assumed power as Nigerian Head of State, and on getting to power, he promised to hand over power to the civilians in 1979. Sadly, he could not see this through as he was assassinated, just six months in office. His successor, General Olusegun Obasanjo continued to implement the political programme as outlined by General Muritala Mohammed. The programme was to end by ushering in democracy in 1979. A 49 member constitutional drafting committee headed by Chief F. R. A Williams was appointed to prepare a draft constitution. After they were done, a constituent assembly headed by Justice Udo Udoma (1995) made final adjustments to the constitution. And a new constitution was promulgated which came into force on 1st, October 1979. The 1979 constitution was fashioned after the American Presidential Constitution, unlike the 1960 and 1963 constitutions that were fashioned after the British Parliamentary System.

The 1999 Constitution

The 1999 constitution is a product of the Military, like that of 1979. Unlike the 1979 constitution, however, the 1999

constitution was an imposition on Nigeria by the military, because it was never debated by Nigerians before it was instituted.

However, the constitution contains some elements of Unitary System For instance, PART 11 Section 1 (1&2), renders state Houses of Assembly inferior because in Part 11 Section 11(4), the constitution empowers the National Assembly to handle the functions of Houses of Assembly when they are unfit to perform their function. The control of the Nigerian police force is also within the exclusive list of the federal government. The implication of all these is that the constitution has theoretically subjugated the federating units to the central government.

CHALLENGES OF NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

Between 1951 and 1999, a period of 48 years, six major constitutions were crafted, all aiming at making Nigeria a federation. However, no sooner would each constitution be operated for about six months than Nigerians would condemn it, as being unsuitable for the country, as a result of disagreements on the size and population of each region and also on the fears of domination among the regions and within the regions. It is therefore not a surprise that within a year of the 1999 constitution in operation, Nigerians started calling for constitutional review. And today, the clamour has gone beyond constitutional review but what Nigerians now call restructuring. In other words, 98 years (1922) after the first constitution was made for Nigeria and 69 years (1951) after federal constitutions were prepared for Nigeria, the citizens (Nigerians) are still clamouring for constitutional review and the restructuring of the Nigerian federal system.

What then are the issues, and why is it difficult to frame a federal constitution that will be accepted by Nigerians? There are, indeed, four perspectives by which the fundamental challenges of Nigerian federalism can be explained and these are, (1) the political economy of constitution making, (2) the nature of the Nigerian state, (3) the absence of hegemony and (4) the military factor.

Political economy of constitution making

Political economy according to Weingast and Wittman (2006) is the methodology of economics, applied to the analysis of political behaviour and institutions in the study of politics, which is why political economy influences historical processes (Weingast and Wittman, 2006). Again, Nikitin (1983) says that political economy is about the basis of the development of society. In other words, it is about economic relationship between people, in terms of the position of the various classes and groups and their interrelationship. Thus, from the aforementioned,

political economy is historical science precisely because it is partisan which deals with the aspects of the economic interrelations between people while at the sometime touching on their vital interests (Nikitin, 1983).

It is against this background that political economy can be used to explain the problem with constitutional engineering in Nigeria from 1951. And that is because a constitution is basically the document that embodies the dialectics of the interrelationship of people within a given geographical compass. In other words, political economy will enable us to understand how economic considerations by the different peoples of Nigeria have been influencing the views of Nigerian political elites and by consequent, the problems and difficulties of framing an acceptable and working federal constitution for the country since 1951.

Thus, from the aforementioned, personal/ethnic interests had been the primary considerations in the process of preparing a federal constitution for Nigeria since 1951. It should be noted that, the peoples of the present day Nigeria were brought together, by the Europeans (the British), largely for economic reasons. Thus, it is clear that from all the different narratives of Nigerian history, there is no doubt that the country, as it is currently constituted may never have existed but for the economic interests of the Europeans (Agbaje, 1992, 1997; Adebanwi, 2010). And that is because what brought Europeans to Africa, in the first place, was economic (trade and commerce).

Consequently, economic prosperity became the primary consideration for European incursion into Nigeria (Africa). And all political arrangements, in terms of political offices and appointments, to ensure European domination were in favour of the Europeans. In other words all organs of the colonial state were dominated by Europeans. Thus, Nigerians were socialized into believing and accepting the fact that the new social organisation (colonial state) must control political power because that is the power that stands as the tool of cornering resources (Agbaje, 1992, 1997; Adebanwi, 2010). And till today, the political elites strongly belief in the dictum that says politics is "who gets what, when and how" and this is the guiding philosophy of Nigerian leaders with regards to their choice a federal constitution.

It has been argued that during colonial era and even immediately after independence the volume of trade and the nature of exportable cash crops determined the economic prosperity of the regions, which influenced the distribution of amenities (Agbaje, 1992, 1997; Adebanwi, 2010). As a result, therefore, the Southern Nigeria realised early, the advantages of this development. Consequently, the distributional and spatial pattern of economic development that characterised the uneven development between the North and the South became a subject for debate at each constitutional making event.

Thus, from 1951, each section of the country had stood

by some peculiar interests which must be reflected in the constitution. For example, the Western Region had always wanted a strong and autonomous region with a weak centre. And that was because the region believed that, it had the resources, material and human to run a successful region (Falola and Dauda, 2017).

The Eastern region on the other hand had always stood for and also, wanted a unitary system, because that would be the system that will guarantee and protect the economic interests of the Igbos, precisely because the Igbos are an ethnic group that is scattered all over the country, engaged in economic activities with enormous investments (Falola and Dauda, 2017).

However, the North, having realised that in terms of material and human resources the region was far behind the South, and therefore always wanted to have political power, by using population as the dominant factor for political and policy decisions and in the distribution of amenities. And that was because all census figures, since the time of colonial rule had shown the North as having more population than the South. Thus such ideas, like quota system, federal character, revenue allocation formula, population, as determinant of sharing amenities were invented to take care of northern interests in order to prevent southern domination of the North, which was securely done by the emphasise on numerical superiority of the North over the South. That is precisely why merit as a determinant factor in political decision for placement and policy options is never applied in Nigeria.

Thus, in Nigeria, "the politics of resources, and the resources of politics" has always been the groundnum in preparing a federal constitution for the country, which is why it is difficult to have a consensus on a federal constitution for Nigeria.

The nature of the Nigerian state

The modern state, a creation of capitalism, came into being when the capitalists needed an institution to protect capital and capitalists' interests. And that was because the coming of industry and of complicated commercial arrangements with large scale economic operations required a different method of managing the evolving social organisation. Thus, with capitalism, the capitalists needed to control workers because of the tension caused by exploitation, oppression and domination by the capitalists (Fadakinte, 2020). Consequently, the state came into being as an institution, an instrument of power in the hands of the capitalists, which became the power house of society. In other words, the development of capitalism with its basic elements, creating a different superstructure for the capitalist Europe, led to the emergence of the modern state which was planted in Nigeria, first as colonial state.

Thus, the colonial state was used by the metropolitan bourgeoisie to restructure the pre-capitalist economy, and

that was because the various Nigerian indigenous societies at that time were at different stages of slavery and feudalism. The consequence was that the societies were without the institutions and structure or the ideology of capitalism to create the needed social classes, with a dominant class that will create a state to manage capitalism.

Also, because there were no capitalist social classes as a result of the absence of large scale manufacturing, productive capitalist industries or of complex commercial activities, there was no dominant economic class. Those who constituted the dominant social class were the few educated elites and the traditional chiefs. Therefore, in terms of capitalism and the modern state, what was in Nigeria before independence was the colonial state which was the colonial administration and government, that created the institutions of state with a new administrative bureaucracy (Fadakinte, 2013). Thus, colonial rule created the colonial state in order to protect European capitalist interest, and that was how the state crept into Nigeria. Today therefore, the Nigerian state, in whatever form it is after flag independence, in whatever condition it is, and whatever may be its nature, is a product of capitalism. In other words, the colonial state represented the interests of the capitalist class in Europe and also performed the function of maintaining European capitalist dominance on colonial Nigeria (Fadakinte, 2013; disagreement on the size and population of each region and also on the fears of domination among the regions and within the regions).

What all this means, according to Ake (1985) is that the development of the state in Nigeria, and its nature till today, all remain at a low level of the primitive accumulation with massive intervention of force. Consequently, because of the low level of the development of the state, it is unable to mediate the struggle between classes and the struggle within the dominant class. This explains why it is difficult to have a consensus regarding the framing of a constitution that will be accepted by all, precisely because there is no united dominant class that stands for the state and whose values will be the dominant values for the society. In other words, the nature and character of the emergent Nigerian state is so insipient that it lacks the strength and capacity to institute a dominant culture that will hold the society together so as to make it possible for the dominant class to frame a workable federal constitution for Nigeria.

The absence of hegemony

Hegemony, according to Gramsci (1976) is about how a class deploys political and ideological instruments to dominate other classes. In other words, hegemony is a form of control that is exercised by a dominant class. It is about the ability and capacity, indeed, the success of a

class in persuading the others in society to accept its own moral, political and its cultural values.

Now, how is the aforementioned definitions and meanings of hegemony relevant to constitution making in Nigeria? The relevance lies in the *modus operandi* of capitalism as a mode of production, which divides society into classes and which makes the dominant capitalist class to dominate society in culture and in ideas. Therefore, capitalism, as a mode of production must necessarily produce a capitalist class, that is, the property class, which becomes the dominant class in society and the dominant class must recognize the need to have a power that will protect its class interests.

Thus, the ideology of hegemony are rooted in the development of capitalism, that is, the modern state is a product of economic activities and hegemony is used by the dominant class in exercising the domination of the other social classes, with their consent, which has come into being, with the rise of class contradictions (Johari, 2012). Therefore, capitalism deploys hegemony which embodies domination at the superstructures of society and the domination is carried out within the economic and political structures of society by using institutions such as the family, religion, political parties, and the mass media, all that control the shaping and influencing human thoughts, including ideas, values and culture (Swingewood, 1979). Consequently, hegemony signifies political leadership by consent and also how it is achieved by the diffusion of the dominant ideology through social institutions in society (Youngman, 2000).

However, in Nigeria, colonialism instituted and imposed capitalism when Nigerians were at the stage of slavery and feudalism and at the time of independence, Nigeria had not evolved the institutions and the capitalist social classes to engage in and manage capitalist production. Consequently, in Nigeria, there is no ruling class, a class that is most powerful economically, for being in control of the economy and politics and also, there is no dominant class hegemony which embodies leadership, discipline, intellectualism and domination.

In a sense therefore, just before and immediately after independence there was no capitalist class to manage capitalism, no capitalist social classes for capitalist production and social relations, no capitalist institutions to form the basic superstructures of society, no local dominating class with the hegemony to construct hegemonic process for nationhood and no indigenous state to protect indigenous capital (Fadakinte, 2020). However, a dominant class exists in Nigeria but not as a unified and cohesive class with a common ideology that will unite them to make them develop a common culture and ideas and subsequently develop the hegemony to construct an acceptable procedure for political actions, including the drawing up of an acceptable constitution for the country. In other words, the dominant class in Nigeria is preoccupied with the struggle for resources, leading to in-fighting, because while they may be dominant in the political sphere, they lack the needed dominance in the economic sphere.

Consequently, because of in-fighting, by factions of the dominant class, they could not develop the ability to speak with one voice as a strong and united class, so as to be able to evolve a virile state and possess the needed hegemony for formalizing power. Consequently, because the dominant class was not united, it could not, as a class, provide the required hegemonic order for an emergent society. So, there has been, since independence, an apparent lack of nationally recognized and collective leadership. Indeed, there is no national dominant class which is made up of individuals that own and control the apex positions in the economy, politics and society. Thus, the dominant class, as a result of their weak conditions, cannot evolve and install an enduring hegemony since independence, because they lack cohesion, discipline, intellectualism and foresighted leadership which now make it difficult to have a set of strong, stable and powerful state institutions. Therefore, because there is no dominant culture, the different ethnic factions of the dominant class occupy the political space with cacophony of voices, making it difficult to have a consensus on a truly federal constitution.

The military factor

Military incursion into governance in 1966, created a very big dilemma to Nigeria's federalism, precisely because military intervention in politics derailed the principles of federalism. Up till 1966, the country practiced "agreed" federation, based on relative autonomy of the federating regions, which started as three, as designed by Nigeria's first generation political leaders. However, Military Government cannot function properly in a highly decentralized society; thus, they ruled Nigeria by centralizing authority so as to have firm control of all the federating units. Also, Military ascendancy to power led to the creation of more states in order to allay the fears of domination expressed by regional/ethnic groups. However, the creation of the initial 12 states in 1967 marked the beginning of the death of the existing autonomy of the federating units. As a result, more powers were given to the federal government thereby depriving the federating units the expected autonomy, in a federation, in terms of the right to control and manage their resources.

The Nigerian civil war of 1967 to 1970 created a problem for Nigeria's federalism. The military onslaught on Nigerian federalism was reinforced by the civil war because the threat to the unity and national security of Nigeria needed a strong central government to stop the dissolution of the federation. The war situation therefore, called for a strong central government so as to be able to prosecute the war and stop Nigeria from disintegration. Directly and indirectly therefore, the period gave more

dents to the derailment of the philosophy and practice of federalism in Nigeria. Thus, today, Nigeria that started with three regions at independence in 1960 is now with 36 states, with a Federal Capital that has the status of a state. Consequently, the military has fragmented the country into multiple states that majority of the states are not self-sustaining but all depend on federal monthly financial allocation, given to them on a sharing formulae that was designed by the military. Thus, the multiplicity of the states has so much weaken the states that they all depend on the federal government for financial interventions. And that is because; as more states are created in Nigeria so the increases the power at the center. Today, the federal government controls everything in the country, from primary schools to tertiary institutions and from primary health centers to teaching hospitals. Indeed, the federal government now funds all the 774 local governments.

Again, the 1999 constitution, even as amended, gave federal government the power to control all the subjects in both the exclusive and concurrent lists, while there is no residual list in the constitution. However, it is the residual list of a federal constitution that defines the autonomy of the units of a federation, because the residual list contains those subjects that are exclusive to the federating units. What is important to note here is that with all the federating states depending on the federal government for survival, and with the federal government controlling the economy, Nigeria is just a federation by name but a unitary system in practice. Thus, with 36 states, majority of them not viable, and the enormous power at the center, federalism was destroyed in Nigeria. However, be that as it may, the problem is how the situation can be redressed in order to have a federation in the true name of it, a federation with autonomous federating units. This is how the military became a problem, with the way they created crisis for federalism in the country and also compounded the problem of crafting a suitable federal constitution for the country.

Conclusion

There are two main issues in this paper, which are as follows:

(1) Nigeria and her long, tortuous and continuos journey (69 years) into federalism.
(2) Nigeria and the challenges of federalism.

These two issues can be summarily stated and explained as follows:

Long journey into federalism

At the time, the British established effective control in the various societies that make up today Nigeria, there existed separate social organizations with their peculiar systems of rule, mode of governance, based on their culture, traditions and values.

However, with the 1951 constitution, Nigeria began to experiment with a federal structure, which continued to be defined and redefined by subsequent constitutions from that of 1954, to the 1999 constitutions. Even though a federal constitution was used to usher in independence in 1960, but by 1966, the military ceased political power, which marked the beginning of the collapse of federal structure in Nigeria. Indeed, since 1966, it has been difficult to have a constitution that will really and truly be federal.

Challenges of federalism

Finally, this paper also reveals that the major problem with drawing up an acceptable federal constitution for Nigeria is the absence of cohesion among the dominant class in Nigeria, the dominant class that operates along ethnic lines. And because there is no cohesive dominant class to establish a dominant culture, there is no class hegemony and there is no strong ruling class, a class that will possess the same ideology and be able to control the economy and politics. Thus, there are no strong socio-political and economic institutions that will make it possible for a united and strong state to emerge and establish dominant culture for a united society (Nigeria). Consequently, each ethnic group continues to fight to protect its own interests. So, till date, a viable state has not emerged in Nigeria to construct a hegemonic process for governance, which will include consensus among the dominant class on policy matters, political actions and indeed with regard to the crafting of a truly federal constitution for the country.

The aforementioned factors, therefore, provide the reasons why socio-political and economic problems continue to characterize Nigeria, precisely because the country continues to run a strong centre (unity system) established by the military and enshrined in the 1999 constitution, making it difficult for Nigeria to run a truly federal system that will be acceptable to all the nationalities.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

Adebanwi W (2010). "Contesting Exclusion: the Dilemmas of Citizenship in Nigeria". The African Anthropologist 12(1):67-75.
Agbaje A (1992). The Nigerian Perss, Hegemony and the Social Construction of Legitimacy, Lewiston, N. Y. Edwin Mellen Press.
Agbaje A (1997). "Mobilising for a New Political Culture", In: Diamond, L. Kirk-Green and Oyediran, O. (eds): Transition Without End:

Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida. Ibadan, Vantage Publsihers.

Ake C (1985). Political Economy of Nigeria, Lagos: Longman.

Awolowo O (1947). Path to Nigerian Freedom: London. Faser and Faber.

Duchacek I (1970), Bicommunical societies and politics. Polities. Publius Journal of Federalism. Special issue 18(21).

Elaigwu JI (2005). The Politics of Federalism in Nigeria Jos, Nigeria: Ayaotu Publishers.

Fadakinte MM (2013). The Nature and Character of the Nigerian State, Explaining Election Crisis in a Peripheral State. British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences 12(11):275-267.

Fadakinte MM (2020). The Struggle for Power in Post-Colonial Africa: Politics without Hegemony and the State. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal 7(2):133-146.

Falola T, Dauda B (2017). Decolonising Nigeria, 1945 – 1960 Politics, Power and Personalities.

Gramsci A (1976). Prison Notebooks, New York: Oxford University Press.

Ikime O (1980). Groundwork of Nigeria History. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nig.)

Jinadu LA (1979). Notes on the Theory of Federlaism, In: Akinyemi A. B. P.D Cole, and W. Ofonagoro (eds) (1979), Readings on Federalism, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs pp. 15-25.

Johari JC (2012). Principles of Modern Political Science, Sterling Publishers Private Ltd., New Delhi.

Livingstone W (1956). Federalism and Constitutional Change, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mazrui AA (1971). "On the Concept of 'We Are All Africans'" American Political Science review 57(1):89-97.

Nikitin PI (1983). The Fundamentals of Political Economy. Moscow, Progress, Publication.

Ojo EO (2009). Mechanisms of National Integration in a Multi-Ethnic Federal State. Ibadan: John Archers.

Ramphal SS (1979). Keynote Addresses. In: A. B. Akinyemi et al, (Eds.), Readings on Federalism, Lagos: Nigerian Instituted of International Affairs pp. 13-25.

Swingewood A (1979). Marx and Modern Social Theory. London: The Macmillan Press.

Udoma U (1995). History and the Law of the Constitution of Nigeria, Lagos: malthouse Press Nigeria Limited.

Watts RL (1970). The Survival and Disintegration of Federation, In Simeon R. (Ed.), Must Canada Fail?, Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press pp. 42-62.

Wheare KC (1963). Federal Government. New York, oxford University Press.

Youngman F (2000). The Political Economy of Adult Education and Development. London: Zed Books.

ACADEMIC JOURNALS
expand your knowledge

African Journal of Political Science and International Relations

Review

India and China in Africa: Rivalry or catching up?

Lucien Nola Nouck

Department of International Relations and Conflict Resolution, Faculty of Laws and Political Science, University of Buea, Cameroon.

The South-South cooperation has been experiencing a second youth with the deepening of Sino-Africa and Indo-Africa relations. In order to secure an important part of the Black continent's enormous natural resources, China and India have pledged to build mutual beneficial partnerships with Africa. In the process, both Asian growing economies are infusing the continent with capital, infrastructure and jobs. If the two Asian drivers' safaris in Africa mark the resurgence of Africa in international affairs after more than a decade of negligence by its traditional Western partners, the emerging South-South partnership being forged by both countries brand themselves as 'win-win' as compared to Western countries relationship with Africa. More, the Indian version, while refuting the idea of being engaged in a strategic rivalry with Beijing, stresses even more to distance itself from the Chinese type that is accused to be solely replicating the old colonial paradigm of the scramble of Africa's raw material resources. This paper assesses the veracity of this assumption by confronting the Indian's project main features to their Chinese counterpart through a cross-examination of key dimensions of both countries' African project and highlights significant similarities as well as notable differences between these two approaches.

Key words: Rivalry, competition strategic partnership, south-south cooperation, China-Africa, India- Africa.

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the emergence of China and India at the beginning of the 21 century represents one of the main strategic challenges for policymakers and academics around the globe. If people are fascinated by the concomitant emergence of both Asian giants, more are worried about the nature of their relation in the course of this emergence. Given the two countries highly conflicting history, one is wary of the capacity of both capitals to drive this exceptional phenomenon without rekindling historical tensions between them.

The similarity of the emergence path, namely growing and integrated economies at the global level, booming trade, military might and readiness with modernized

nuclear capabilities as well as asserted regional and global diplomatic ambition, all indicates that Beijing and Delhi are poised to strengthen their rivalry. Yet, leaderships in the two countries do not see themselves as rivals. After Wen JIABAO, the former Chinese Premier, talking to journalists in Beijing declared « *I hope you can send my message back to the great Indian people, that we're not competitors, we are friends* », Manmohan Singh, his Indian counterpart responded in Kuala Lampur few months later that « *there is a misconception that India and China are competitors, and this is not* true » Egreteau (2007). Still, observers find it difficult not to analyze both countries' foreign

E-mail: lucienouck@gmail.com.

engagement, notably in Africa or Central Asia with regard to access to natural resources, from the competition lens.

If African governments have warmly welcomed Beijing's and New Delhi's re-engagement on the continent, Chinese and Indian inroads in Africa have however created mixed responses from the African private sector and Western traditional partners of the continent. Many have claimed that through closer economic and trade ties characterized by a strong focus on resources, China is actually pursuing a neo-colonialist policy in Africa. India, has somehow partaken with tenets of this view in trying to brand its African 'blueprint' as more African development-oriented than the Chinese one.

China and India rushes in Africa are generally described as rooted in their ambition to secure natural resources, crucial inputs for maintaining their growing economies afloat. This is mainly explained by China's transformation into a world workshop while India is seeking to follow the same path. It is equally linked to the nature of the globalization of economy that has put additional strains on resources access worldwide resulting in the normality of resources scarcity. Consequently, with Chen (2018) the quest for resources would inevitably lead to a clash for two mains reasons: resources security is considered highly fundamental to national interest while devising a strategy to achieve this goal must be given precedence over all others issues. For some proponents of this view, this situation has strengthened the resolve of the leaderships in both capitals to devote their efforts in favor of a new international order, the existing one being incompatible with their aspiration. As Mohan and Powell (2015:145) puts it, Beijing and Delhi henceforth have developed a "preference for regimes and empires rather than markets and institutions, and this preference seems to enable them to obtain energy resources without participating in international mechanism".

This article looks at the China-India partnerships with Africa and reasserts that, while a possible military clash over the quest of resources in Africa cannot be totally ruled out, it is unlikely to happen taking into account three fundamental considerations rightly summarized by Calvin Chen (2018). First, natural resources being sourced from farther shores in foreign countries that can hardly be considered as being part of their natural zone of influence, neither Beijing nor Delhi can manage to achieve an access denial to the other. Consequently, it is only through partnerships characterized by a smart use of economic assets and others soft power tools that China and India can secure permanent access to African natural resources. Second, because of their asymmetrical capabilities, competition will remain prominent but cooperation wherever possible will prove less costly. Third, having integrated into their calculations that they will have to live with resources scarcity, like other countries do, in line with constraints imposed by

globalization which has fundamentally limited the capacity of any country to freely maneuver on the global scene in building its most desirable ecosystem, policies within these two countries have therefore been readjusted accordingly. It is from this angle that we can better grasp the new orientation taken by Beijing in distancing itself progressively form highly energy-and-resources hungry industries while fostering investments in renewable energy where the country has become one the world leader in photovoltaic or in terms of electrical automobiles market. In India, similar reflections are taking place with bright prospects. This capacity of policy adaptation constitutes a buffer tool in dealing with uncertainties than can be used in limiting the chances of direct confrontation while striving to achieve energy security. This is what allows energy and mineral resources around the globe and particularly in Africa to be discovered and exploited sometimes by both Chinese and Indian investors.

This study contends that if it is obvious China factor is prominent in any single Indian move in Africa, for two reasons at least, the timing and, mostly, the nature and characteristics of both regimes, India is actually trying to catch up with China than actually competing against it. Regarding the timing, India missed to seize the opportunity of Africa's opening and diversification to nontraditional partners (USA and Europe) in the early 90s. Calvin Chen explains that "although the falling-out between Western nations and Africa in the 1990s created an unanticipated opening for engagement, India, preoccupied with implementing and consolidating its economic reforms, delayed it outreach to Africa by nearly a decade" Chen (2018). At the same time, China while acknowledging the challenges associated with doing business in Africa (tough criticism from Western countries on its unwillingness to integrate good governance and human rights in its deals), has come to the conclusion that the benefits it can gain are by far more important that the perils. Thus, by the time Delhi finally launched its charm offensives, Beijing has already established a strong position on nearly all most lucrative oil and gas spots.

As for the nature and characteristics of both regimes, the type of government in charge at Delhi has seriously impeded Indian forays. As a parliamentary democracy borrowed from Britain, Indian authorities are under constant scrutiny form the opposition in the parliament and a vibrant civil society as well as a proactive and dynamic press, making it difficult to engage the country anyhow on the international arena. As India insists on maintaining a solid reputation as a responsible stakeholder in international affairs, it is reluctant to foster deals that would certainly yield economic gains but can contribute to tarnish its reputation abroad. It is therefore understandable why in 2005, for example, OVL actually outbid CNOOC for control of Nigeria's Akpo field, but the Indian government blocked the agreement, wary of

political risk involved Chen (2018). The political risk here is the possible collusion with some Nigerian officials that, if eventually confirmed, had the potential to lead to a cabinet downfall.

Beijing does not have the same worries. As a centralized rule under the tight direction of the Chinese Communist Party, it virtually has nobody to report to. When priorities are set, the government just devises a strategy aiming at achieving the goal anticipated. In view of securing resources access in Africa, Beijing has opted to fill in the vacuum created by Western countries in a number of pariah states. In 1995 and 1996 China signed several deals with Nigeria after the military coup in 1993 and the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and 8 fellow Ogoni activists in 1995 by the military regime of Sani Abacha ignited condemnation worldwide and prompted sanctions from the European Union and the USA. In another pariah state, China decided to engage Sudan and takeover Chevron's stake in an oil concession secured in 1974 after the company was bound to leave the country in 1993 following Washington's decision to suspend economic assistance after the military coup led by Omar el Bashir in 1989 and eventually its labelling in 1993 as terrorism state-sponsor. In 1995, CNPC inked an oil-development agreement with Khartoum while grasping three other development blocks through international auction. Where China pursues a complex-free real politics with regards to access to African mineral and energy sources in Africa, most of the time openly confronting Western partners and interests, India is concerned about avoiding ruffling feathers both within the country and in the West, and carries out a particularly cautious investment approach in this aspect.

A brief review of the concept of rivalry in international relations that helps us to ascertain whether China and India deepening engagement in Africa can only be viewed from a "rivalry" angle was followed. The study assessed the veracity of India's above-mentioned assumption by confronting the Indian's project main features to their Chinese counterpart through a cross-examination of key dimensions of both countries' African project. Contrary to Delhi's insistence in trying to differentiate its variant from the Chinese one, this study posits that both partnerships clearly share in common objectives and motives while the main difference rests with means implemented to carry them out.

RIVALRY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

States' engagement on the international arena is often done in terms of rivalry. When one talks of rivalry, the military dimension immediately comes to mind. However, an analysis of rivalry shows that apart from the military confrontation, rivalry can equally be manifested in a wide range of interstate interactions. Therefore, understanding the characteristics of rivalry between states is of paramount importance. A comprehensive summary of the conceptualization of interstate rivalry is found in Chand (2019) drawing essentially from Thompson work.

In this article, we read that early assessments of rivalry focused on what is called "strategic rivalry". In this perspective, the analysis of rivalry rested on recording the number of conflict's occurrences between two states for a certain period. In their approach based on dispute density, Diehl and Goertz (2001) opine that two states are viewed as rivals if within a period of 20 years they record at least six military confrontations. Here, it is understood that military clashes are the very essence of rivalry. The problem with such an approach, as rightly observed by William and Thompson (2001), is that the analysis being restricted to a single unit, it fails to explain why certain rivalries do not necessarily lead to a military clash.

The termination of military actions being not necessarily synonymous to the extinction of the rivalry, another approach in characterizing rivalry lays emphasis on the notion of threat perception approach. Rival states are generally dyads endowed with similar capabilities where neither party is capable of imposing its views on the other without further fueling the conflict of interest. Here, rivalry is characterized by the conscious self-developed perception one state has about the other. For William and Thompson (2001), It entails a series of conflicts rather than an independent one that can develop mainly owing to the difficulty of two states to either share the same space (such as territorial dispute) or the same view regarding a particular issue within a particular context. Rivalry viewed through the lens of perceptions is therefore a constructed competition based on clashing interests.

A third way to look at rivalry deals with the nature of the rivalry with focus on two key dimensions: issues and military. Here rivalry is measured in terms of armed confrontations and threat perceptions, but equally based on specific issues. In this perspective, Mitchell and Thies (2011) have elaborated a two dimensional-measure: an issue-related dimension where the number of dyadic issues (geopolitical issues such as border disputes or water sharing disputes) at the diplomatic level are recorded and a military-related dimension that analyses the number of attempts to settle an issue through military action. This perspective presents a more balanced view of rivalry, for it does portray more than the sole military confrontation aspect of the concept. It clearly poses it that states competition is based on specific issues such as border disputes, regime survival, control over water resources, etc. Ignited from a single contentious issue, Mitchell and Thies (2011) believe rivalry progressively escalates to a multifaceted competition.

Can it therefore be said that each time two states compete over an issue or set of issues they are rivals? Rivalry requires more than that. Chand says no. To him, to be fully qualified as rivalry, the competition needs a "temporal proximity" which is "a thread that links the conflict/competition between the dyads". For Mitchell and

Thies (2011), such a temporal proximity could encompass broader objectives at the strategic level namely regional influence or regional hegemony. It is to say that due to rivalry between two states, a contentious issue that arises in particular region of the world would span into broader issues leading consequently to a dyadic multifaceted issue-based rivalry. However, conflicting issues do not arise in a vacuum. They proceed from a specific historical context of the dyad. From this angle, rivalry goes far beyond military confrontation alone. It is actually, as Chand (2019) put it the commitment to "fighting for an issue that links competitions within a broader policy objective, be it regional hegemony or control over geopolitically significant possessions".

Such a picture fits perfectly with the China-India dyad. Whenever one talks of China and India, it is actually the idea of 'competition' between both parties that immediately comes to mind highlighting an essentially hostile nature. In Africa, both 'competing" parties have projected their 'rivalry' with the aim of securing privileged access to all types of resources for the sake of power and security at home and abroad likely to lead, where necessary, to a possible hegemony. This view corresponds to the realist or neorealist perspective of international relations that posits that competition is the key driver of interstate relations. In other words, if China-India strategic rivalry is understood as the will of one state to counter long-term strategic ambitions of the other state, it is clearly observed that rivalry is based not only on past bilateral clashes but rather on contentious and irreconcilable perceptions of the future. We can therefore say with Colaresi and Thompson (2001:275) that strategic rivalry involves interstate relations projection towards the future in essentially conflicting terms where past military standoffs are no longer a prerequisite.[1]

CHINA AND INDIA DEPLOYMENT IN AFRICA

Similarities

China and India respective "strategic partnership" have objective and strategy in common.

Objectives

In the name of oil and metals

It is generally admitted that the current keen interest taken by both countries in Africa is driven by their ambition to secure access to raw materials and achieve national energy security in view of maintaining the current economic development pace on one hand and open up new markets for their cheap manufactured goods on the other. Of all African resources sought by both countries, oil is of paramount importance. From this perspective,

one can understand why both capitals have embarked on aggressive oil diplomacy with the ambition to secure oil supplies for their growing domestic market on the short run while trying to position themselves as major players on the international oil market on the long run.

Actually, Chinese and Indian booming economies are extremely oil hungry and this has led to a profound reshaping of both international oil market and geopolitical setting. Industrialization and the subsequent raising of living standards have resulted in an exponential rise of oil demand. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2007), China and India will account for 43% of the global increase in oil demand between 2005 and 2030 while their combined oil consumption will increase from 9.3 to 23.1 mb/d during the same period. This represents an annual growth of 3.7%. Considering that the number of automobiles will continue to grow in both countries (from about 22 million in 2005 to more than 200 million in 2030 in China, and from 11 to 115 million in India), 2/3 of this oil demand will come from the transport sector.

Moreover, given low levels of production of Chinese and Indian oil fields combined with insignificant proven reserves, both countries will have to import more oil to satisfy this growing demand. China and India additional oil imports are projected to increase from 5.4mb/d in 2006 to 19.1mb/d in 2030, that is more than the current USA and Japan combined imports. The IEA goes further; the two Asian drivers will increasingly rely on oil to meet their energy needs knowing that it will represent 25% of India's primary fuel demand in 2030, a 24% jump as compared to 2005, while in China it will progress from 19 to 21%. Lastly, as incomes continue to grow in China, per-capita oil demand will remain higher as compared to India. To conclude, the IEA predicts: "Oil will remain the main focus of attention for the Chinese and Indian governments in their efforts to address growing worries about energy security. This reflects both the prospect of a sharp increase in their import needs and the limited scope for switching away from oil products – especially in the transport sector".

Meanwhile, hydrocarbons resources of Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) countries are also expected to experience a strong growth. In 2007, the total output of the top 10 SSA oil producers reached 5.6mb/d, out of which 5.1mb/d was exported. In 2030, this production is projected to reach 7.4mb/d from 6.4mb/d for export. Like today, Nigeria and Angola would continue to serve as locomotives of this train, as new producers join the club of oil producers IEA (2007).

China and India are then battling to get a pie of this amount of oil. China-Africa and India-Africa trade structures reveal that Beijing and Delhi top trading partners are oil-producing countries. In this regard, Muller-Kraenner (2008) believes the quest of energy security has fundamentally transformed both countries' foreign policies, giving birth to a new "emerging foreign policy" that affects the existing geopolitical setting. In

order words, the Africa-ward oil diplomacy pursued by China in its "quest for energy security is more than simple economics. It is about China's overall development strategy; the direction of China's modernization program [and] what kind of China is emerging as world a power" Ian Taylor (2006). The same can be said about India.

As a result, China has succeeded in establishing itself as a major player in the African oil sector with strongholds secured in big producing countries such as Nigeria and Angola. Thanks to Chinese investment, Sudan has shifted from a net-oil importer to a net-oil exporter status in less than five years (1993-1997). China is equally searching for oil in medium scale producing countries such as Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea as well as in new producing countries like Ghana. We learn from IDE-JETRO (2009) that "today Chinese oil companies are operating in nearly 20 African countries in both the upstream and downstream sectors, and pose a significant strategic and economic challenge to both established majors and smaller independents, which for many years enjoyed unparalleled ascendancy in the continent's energy sector."

Africa is equally a significant source of meeting India's energy security. In 2014, India sourced primarily its oil from Nigeria and Angola where Indian companies have secured some assets. Regarding gas, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea are among India's top four suppliers. Today, Indian public sector company ONGC Videsh has significant investments in the African oil & gas sector, particularly in Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. In order to secure access to hydrocarbon reserves, Delhi is equally providing African countries with its expertise in oil exploration, refining, consultancy, training and infrastructure development. However, Delhi's efforts still hardly compete with the $25 billion investment China has poured into the African oil and gas sector (Business Standard, January 20, 2016).

In the name of new markets

Contrary to 'Afro-pessimists', India and China consider the continent as a market with higher potential for their manufactured goods. Africa, whose current population is around 1.3 billion in 2020 based on the latest United Nations estimates, is equivalent to 16.72% of the total world population and full of customers with various needs that both Asian economies look forward to satisfy. For this reason, China and India have been financially encouraging their respective companies to invest and capture market shares in Africa.

In the case of China, there are indications that the central government has played a prominent role in supporting state owned enterprises (SOEs) to direct FDIs in priority to Africa. Sautman and Hairong (2009) report that one senior Indian official have described Africa as "a land for outstanding business opportunities" while another

called on Indian businessmen not to "shy away from risks" for "where risks are, rewards are there". They were speaking at the India-Business partnership Summit jointly organized by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Federation of Indian Chambers and Commerce and Industry (FICCI) in January 2009.

The current volume of Chinese and Indian engagements across the continent suggests they are positive about the business environment as compared to other investors who are very critical about investment constraints, political stability and even physical security. According to a study carried out by McKinsey (2017), for two decades now, China has managed, from an initial insignificant role to become the Africa's most important trading partner. In 2018, China exchanged with the continent for $185 billion up from $ 155 billion in 2017, a growth of nearly 20% per year. Foreign direct investment has even recorded a faster increase in the past decade with around 40% jump per year. These burgeoning ties are lifted by thousands of Chinese firms operating across the continent. McKinsey reveals that about 10 000 Chinese-owned firms are working in Africa in different sectors with 1/3 in manufacturing, 1/4 in services and 1/5 both in trade and in construction as well as real estate. More specifically, around 12% of the continent industrial production worth $500 billion in total per year is carried out by Chinese companies. In infrastructure, Chinese companies control almost half of the Africa's construction projects awarded through international bidding processes. Moreover, Chinese businesses seem to be laying emphasis on responding to Africa's market needs than on exports. By going beyond trading and contracting opportunities, the overall volume of investment carried out by these firms is an indication of their long-term engagement in Africa.

India, the second biggest growing economy in Asia, is also increasing its economic footprint in Africa. The Africa-India trade stood at $62 billion in 2018 with a notable 22% increase as compared to the previous year. Thanks to this rapid development in trade, India has become in 2016, Africa's fourth most important trading partner even though China's levels are almost three times higher than India's ones. Africa's main exports to India include crude oil, gold, coal and other minerals while Africa principally imports refined petroleum and pharmaceuticals that account for about 40% of total exports to African markets. Regarding FDI, in 2018, the overall investment in Africa stood at $54 billion, India with $15 billion was ranked the 4th biggest investor on the continent. Initially targeting principally Mauritius for obvious social and cultural ties, India's investments have expanded to Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Kenya, Egypt and Tanzania as well as North African countries, to a lesser extent Samuel and Ihssane (2019:04).. If Indian investment will continue to grow at a steady pace, they will however continue to lag behind those of others partners, namely China. As seen earlier that Chinese

firms are active in a various range of sectors, the structure of Indian imports from Africa suggests that New Delhi current economic engagement tend to be strongly resource-focused.

In the name of a new international order

Beijing's engagement with Africa has a strong political dimension that is as important as the economic one. Over the past 15-20 years, China has been pursuing a proactive foreign policy. Shifting from its isolationism of the past and as a manifestation of its ambition to play a major role on world affairs, China has been expanding its bilateral diplomatic network, enhancing its involvement in multilateral organizations and joining regional organizations dealing with security and economic questions. This proactive engagement is seen in Beijing as a kind of "power multiplier".

Tull (2008) explains this foreign policy redefinition by three factors. First, owing to the economic success at home, China has become more confident in dealing with the external world. Pursuing an active foreign policy in this case helps to boost the prestige of the country. Second, China has learnt from the financial crisis that hit Asia in 1997 that regional and international stability are critical to the Chinese economy for it to continue to grow smoothly. In this context, only an active foreign policy can help to defend and protect national interests abroad. Third, because the US hegemony represents a serious threat to the "peaceful rise" of China as a global power, Beijing has developed the concept of "multi polar world" that consists in forging flexible alliances to counter the US hegemony and build a fair international order. By relying on these allies, primarily to be searched in the South, Beijing's ambition is to allow itself more options in asserting its domestic and international interests. China's engagement in Africa should therefore be viewed from this angle, not as a peculiar policy towards the continent, but rather as part of a global strategy similarly applied to other regions of the world (Latin America).

In practice, this results in notable benefits for the Chinese authorities. African countries represent an important reservoir of diplomatic support in international organizations with one country-one vote system, such as the UN Commission on Human Rights, where African votes have always proved crucial in barring successive western attempts to condemn China on human rights issues. It is also believed that African votes have helped China to win the hosting of prestigious international events such as the Olympic Games and the World Exposition. Finally, gathering African countries diplomatic support also serves the cause of the 'One China Principle' even though the Taiwan factor is less prominent today than a few years ago in the Chinese foreign policy regarding Africa. Yet, while the China-Taiwan competition is losing in intensity, another rivalry has come to fill the vacuum. The silent rivalry that is currently growing between China and Japan stems from Tokyo's ambition to change its current status of economic giant and political dwarf. If Japan were to obtain a permanent seat in a reformed Security Council of the United Nations, Chinese influence in the region would automatically be significantly reduced. Knowing how critical African votes are in this issue, Tokyo is also stepping up its engagement with the continent. Its status of second largest donor to Africa allows it to use ODA as a formidable political tool to enhance visibility on the international scene.

India on its part is rather in search for an international recognition. In this line, it has assigned its foreign policy two major objectives: the reform of institutions of global governance and the preservation of a strategic autonomy, in other words, the building of an environment favorable to its development without being constrained by any global or regional power. For the first objective, India rightly considers that institutions such as the UN or financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank were established by developed countries to perpetuate their domination on world affairs. Their representation in these bodies is therefore biased against countries of the Southern hemisphere. Considering its population, economic progress and considerable political capital as well as nuclear power status, India strongly advocates the reform of these institutions to get a better representation in them. As concerning the second objective, this mantra has always been present in India foreign policy, the one of the NAM, the policy that claims the right to follow its own development path, the third 'world way'. To Dubey (2008), for the implementation of these two priorities, the promotion of South-South cooperation is capital.

In its efforts to consolidate its status of emerging economy, India needs the world to shift its focus from internal problems of poverty and inequality to its role of a country able to provide aid to the needy. In this line, in 2003 the then Indian Minister of Finance, Jaswant Singh, decided to use development cooperation, that is turning the country from the status of ODA recipient to the one of ODA donor, to harness more international political influence Mthembu (2018). In this process, even though Indian financial assistance to African countries is still lower compared to China, it has however increased notably over the recent few years and New Delhi expects African countries to recall all of these when the time comes to vote for the reform the UN system and grant it a seat in an enlarged UN Security Council.

More, in launching the IBSA Initiative with Brazil and South Africa, India expects indirectly to meet its foreign policy goals by rallying all countries from South Asia, Africa and Latin America behind its international Agenda. The issue of trade serves as a case point. For Chakraborty et al. (2012), globalization has made it imperative for emerging countries and LDCs to enhance their bargaining power in international negotiations in

view of curbing the dominance of Western countries in global policy making. IBSA therefore seeks to become the "platform that can build a sustainable alliance to protect the interests of emerging economies in Asia, Africa and South America". In fact, with the failure of the Doha Round which means the strengthening of trade barriers, developing countries' interests are more at stake than those of Western countries. Looking at the issue from the specific angle of TRIPS and Public Health, WTO has indicated in 2005 that amendment of the provision on 'compulsory licensing' and parallel imports' was possible provided more than 2/3 of member countries ratify it within two years. The amendment would lead to greater exports overtures of pharmaceutical products for India and Brazil. Since, developing countries have so far not succeeded in hitting the targeted number, IBSA perfectly serves the cause of coordinating the efforts of the global South in constructing a fairer international Public health order. Similarly, the EU-US joint draft, presented during the WTO Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003, crystallized the opposition of developing countries face to insignificant commitments from these two blocs of countries in lowering their agricultural subsidy within a certain period. India, but also China, played a key role in making the voice of the South heard concerning food and livelihood security as well as rural development concerns.

Again, on October 2, 2020, amidst the Covid-19 pandemics, India and South Africa made a joint submission to the Council of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of WTO, asking for an easing of intellectual property (IP) rules for Covid-19. For both countries, without an amendment of current rules, developing countries are likely not to benefit immediately from a vaccine when it will be available. This move led by India, that controls a significant share of the generic drug market in Africa, was actually echoing a communique of the African Union calling for the removal of all constrains pertaining to copyright, industrial designs, patents and the protection of undisclosed information or trade secrets to ensure an equitable access to any successful COVID-19 vaccine. Here, India is advocating for the implementation of the "Doha Declaration on public health by WTO members in 2001, which refers to the right to grant compulsory licenses — where a government can license the use of a patented invention without the consent of the patent-holder" (AP News, June 25, 2020). Like with HIV where Delhi, alongside South Africa, fought against the Western drug industry on the patent issue, India actions are meant to highlight its posture as a spokesperson of the Global South while securing market opportunities for its dynamic pharmaceutical industry.

Strategy

Sovereignty, non-interference and no conditionality

The cornerstone of both Chinese and Indian Africa's

policies is equality, mutual respect, non-interference in internal affairs and absence of conditionality in the provision of aid. Actually, the notions of sovereignty and non-interference are not new concepts since they have always been at the base of both countries foreign policies. Furthermore, they represent the essence of China and India's definitions of the very idea of state and international relations. They are not therefore peculiar to Africa.

By tying development assistance to political and economic reforms, Western donors' conditionalities have seriously affected the sovereignty of African states. The Sino-Indian rhetoric about respect of sovereignty and non-interference posits that both countries do not have any paternalistic approach vis-a-vis Africa and helps both Asian drivers to brand themselves as an "appealing alternative to the West". More important, in their attempt to distinguish themselves from the former colonial masters, both China and India make a point in stressing that no one but Africans themselves are entitled to choose the type of society they want to build. In the final analysis, we can say with Davies et al. (2008) that "the fact that aid is bilaterally negotiated and recipient countries feel that they determine what projects are required in line with their national development priorities […] perpetuates the feeling of ownership of the aid process amongst African leaderships. Perceptions of the seemingly non-prescriptive nature of […] aid are complemented by the [...] approach of underpinning aid with commercial incentives".

The "Angola Model"

In April 2004, the Indian state owned ONGC Videsh signed an agreement with Shell to buy its 50% stake in off shore Block 18 offering $370 million for the transaction. The Angolan government refused to validate the deal and instead put it on sale where it eventually accepted a Sonangol Sinopec International (SSI), a joint venture between Sonangol and Sinopec bid worth $725 million coupled with $2.4 billion aid from China. The aid was to serve for the rebuilding of Angolan infrastructure road and rail infrastructure. The "Angola model" was born. Practically speaking, the "Angola Model" is a barter arrangement where commodities serve as collateral for the provision of low-interest loans.

This type of arrangement has become the standard way of doing business, mostly from Asian National Oil Companies (NOC) operating on the continent. Two main reasons can explain this fact. Sustained rises in oil prices and the fact that China, India and also South Korea have opted for securing long term provision of oil rather than relying on the international market have considerably enhanced the bargaining capacity of oil-producing countries, encouraging them to tighten state ownership and reduce foreign companies' shares. Some African countries with poor infrastructure and willing to diversify

their economies, have therefore decided to make use of their new strong bargaining positions by conditioning preferential access to their oil and mineral sectors to companies whose government's is willing to couple oil and mineral resources' investments with investments in other sectors of the economy. It is in this light that a former Nigerian minister of state for petroleum has indicated that companies proposing attractive deal packages would be awarded rights of first refusal on oil blocks Downs (2007).

Major resources seeking deals signed in Africa by China are done on the "Angola Model" basis. This is the case with the China-DR Congo resources for infrastructures deal, a barter trade agreement whereby large infrastructure investments were to be provided by a Sino-Congolese joint venture, Sicomines, in exchange for access to concessions of copper and cobalt. The initial contract provided that the DRC would be provided with much-needed infrastructure, valued at US$ 6 billion but the deal was eventually revised Nola Nouck (2009). One of the biggest and spectacular deals under this scheme was recorded in 2010 when "OVL and CNOOC offered to joint Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) to make a $5 billion bid to secure Kosmos Energy's stake in the Jubilee oil fields, one of the largest discoveries in West Africa in the last decade. GNPC choose to work with CNOOC as a result of $10.4 billion in loans for infrastructure projects and an additional $3billion in loan for development of Ghana's oil and gas sectors, all backed by Chinese banks. In comparison, the Indian government permits OVL to invest only in projects worth $75 million or less or is unable or perhaps unwilling to offer the kind of comprehensive financial packages that are often attached to Chinese bids" Biswas (2016).

Learning from its Angolan series of misfortunes, Indian public ONGC has teamed up with private steel maker Mittal in a joint-venture- ONGC Mittal energy - which has secured oil for infrastructure contract in Nigeria worth $6 billion under the "Angola Model". The package includes a refinery, a power plant and railway lines. During the 2005-7 oil block bids, Indian companies OMEL, Sterling and Essar won six oil blocks in total.

Differences

Whether it is from the political, financial, human or cultural perspectives, both Asian countries' approaches strategic partnerships with Africa differ significantly in terms of means mobilized in this effect.

Political leverage

United Nations Security Council seat

In its African safari, contrary to Delhi, Beijing has a major asset, a permanent seat in the UNSC it can resort to in support of a 'friend' in need. Sudan remains a case study in this regard. China has been blamed for undermining international community's efforts to solve the Darfur crisis due to its enormous oil investments in the country.

Initially, Beijing has spared no effort in avoiding Sudan being sanctioned by the UNSC, "business is business. We try to separate business from politics. Secondly, I think the internal situation is an internal affair, and we are not in position to impose on them" Zhou Wenzhong, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in 2004 to justify Beijing's reluctance to pressure Sudan over Darfur. Beijing's position eventually evolved significantly. Chinese authorities have concluded that a strict idea of sovereignty was no longer tenable. They realized that by portraying the country as the "godfather" of Darfur killings, the ever-growing pressure of Western countries and activists would extremely affect the 'responsible stakeholder's reputation of the country, mostly at the eve of the Beijing Olympics; Moreover, many African countries also were starting to lose their patience over Khartoum's hard stand on the issue. Through a strategy of 'influence without interference', the Chinese leadership then decided that instead of remaining observer, playing an active role in the resolution of this crisis would best serve China by avoiding that UN actions harm its oil interests. At the same time, appearing as the country that has convinced Sudan to accept a compromise would ensure a useful facelift to its international image.

However, it is clear that if the international community was right in pressuring China over the Darfur crisis for it obviously had huge economic leverage over Sudan, the general criticism ignored other countries such as India and Malaysia that were equally pumping oil in that country. India, contrary to China, that has always escaped the international scrutiny over its dealings in Sudan, is seriously handicapped by the absence of a permanent seat in the UNSC and the political weight as well as diplomatic prestige it carries. As a means of compensation, New Delhi makes it imperative to appear as the defender of developing countries' interests in every international forum as exemplified by the WTO Doha Round in 2008. In addition, India also engage its African partners in socio-economic domains where it can demonstrate it relative strength as "partner of development" such as the campaign for the re-writing of intellectual property rights (IPR) in favor of all developing countries. The exports of generic drugs to treat HIV/AIDS are an indication of this ambition.

"Frequent flyer" travel diplomacy

If diplomacy goes hand in hand with symbolism, then China's Africa diplomacy is the very expression of symbolism. For over 20 years now, it has become a tradition for the Chinese Foreign Minister to begin each year with a diplomatic tour of Africa. High-level leadership exchange visits represent the other major tool China

resort to in view of building personal leadership ties and strengthen bilateral relations in various areas. This includes regular annual trips by Chinese top figures to the continent such as Presidents Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Xingping as well as Premiers Wen Jiabao, Li Keqiang and other key leaders. As the former Angolan President Dos Santos revealed how much "he appreciated the fact that China assigns importance to Africa" (BBC Monitoring, June 21, 2006), African leaders, who also make frequent reciprocal visits to China, see this 'frequent flyer travel' diplomacy as an indication that for China, Africa really matters. In addition, a series of mid-lower level exchange visits are also organized on a regular basis. They include diplomats, economics officials, journalists and businesspersons as well as other decision-makers. Similarly, the China Communist Party (CCP) also extends invitations to African parliaments and political parties' leaders. This is for Uhuru Kenyatta, "a clear indication that China is committed to Africa development agenda on the basis of a win-win partnership"

Here again, India initially lived in the shadow of China as it astonishingly lacked the political visibility carried by reciprocal high-level visits. In more than 60 years of independence, only two Prime Ministers have visited a key partner such as Nigeria. This was really a source of concern for Indian business circles for it is obvious that during these visits hurdles to major economic deals are addressed. More important, where China constantly reaffirmed its presence, the absence of India at the highest level might have been interpreted by African partners as New Delhi's reluctance to long term commitment and comfort those who believed that India ventures in Africa were solely opportunistic, in other words that India only courted Africa for its votes at the UN. The matter was serious enough to make a former Foreign Secretary of the Government of India ask "how can African leaders take us seriously if our leaders are too busy to visit them? Mansingh (2009). On this front, India is clearly catching up. Tirumurti, the man in charge of India's ties with Africa, declared on May 29, 2019 "there has been unprecedented intensification of our political engagement with Africa with 29 visits to African countries at the level of President, Vice President and Prime Minister apart from several Ministerial visits. These visits have been in both directions. Subsequent to the visit of 41 Heads of State/Heads of Government who attended IAFS-III, we have hosted over 35 leaders from Africa for various events in the last nearly five years." He continued by saying that "Our engagement is not limited only to the bilateral political level. Today, India and Africa have comprehensive diplomatic mechanisms at all three levels - continental, regional and bilateral and through multilateral fora. In addition to Summits (IAFS I, II, III), we have had three meetings with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of Africa. We are looking at ways to enhance cooperation" (The Economic Times, May 29,

2019). Tirumurti was speaking at the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi within the framework of the Africa Day.

Chinese high visibility is confirmed on the ground by its large diplomatic network. Beijing has an embassy in every African country it has diplomatic with, that is almost in 44 countries. The only exception is Somalia due to obvious security reasons. Moreover, in 40 of these countries, Beijing has commercial counselor offices while it maintains eight consulates- general in eight countries. US Senate (2008). On this aspect, New Delhi has decided to increase the footprint of India's overseas presence while equally enabling the provision of better public services to the local Indian communities. On July 05, 2019, the Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced, while disclosing the budget, the opening of 18 new embassies in Africa to take the total to 47. The ultimate goal here is actually to push India's diplomatic footprint as a rising power (The Economic Times, July, 05, 2019).

"Deep pockets" policy

Chinese financial engagements in Africa are far more important than Indian ones as reflected by trade figures. In 2018, China exchanged with the continent for $185 billion up from $ 155 billion in 2017 as compared to $62 billion recorded by India in 2018 with a notable 22% increase. In the investment front, China is also leading by far; they spoke at the first of a series of annual meetings of the African Development Bank (AfDB) in India in May 2017. Narendra Modi said the country has so far extended 152 lines of credits worth close to $8 billion to as many as 44 African countries. China has extended at least $5 billion each to Angola, Sudan and Nigeria. In Africa, China pursues a 'deep pockets' policy India cannot just follow for the simple reason that China SOEs, which enjoy a state financial support, are able to outbid competitors, namely Indian in this case, for the acquisition of contracts awarded by African governments. In one word, India is not yet in position to compete $ for $ with China for nearly each time Indian company has competed with a Chinese counterpart in Africa, it has lost. For instance, "In 2006, OVL again ran up against SSI as it made an aggressive bid of $1 billion for Angola's deep water blocks 15(06), 16(06) and 18(06). SSI shocked the global markets by bidding $750 million for block 15(06) alone and a staggering $2.2 billion for blocks 17(06) and 18(06). Its total bid of $2.975 billion was nearly triple of that of OVL's". Where Indian companies managed to be successful in outbidding others players, Chand (2019) reveals that "the Indian government's aversion to risk and inability to match favorable loans by the Chinese state has led to the unraveling of those deals" as the aforementioned Ghana experience suggest.

As the competition with China for African resources

will get tougher, India simply finds it very difficult to catch up with China and Indian businessmen are amongst the first to agree that reducing the gap with the Chinese will be hard if not simply impossible: "We are nearly five to seven years late," admits Prashant Ruia, CEO of Essar Group. "Competing with the Chinese is impossible, to be honest. They are building roads, airports and projects as a grant. They are taking a 20-year investment risk, something private companies like us cannot do. We do not have the kind of backing that the Chinese have, they are present on a much larger scale too. They have had a head start and have been there for the past 10 years" (Forbes India, May 24, 2010).

However, Indians are not the only victims of Chinese raids in Africa as indicated by Harry Broadman (2007), author of a World Bank study on China and India's investments in Africa. "The Chinese have deep pockets. They have the ability to undercut and win every contract – and not just against India. It's the US and Europe, too".

Actors and agents

Public against private

While majors' operations carried out by China in Africa are conducted by big SOEs, those of India, except OMEL, are essentially mounted by private companies. This is actually what makes Indian ventures in Africa different from those of China. Private networks are what drove India's relations with Africa, while government-to-government accords, at least initially, characterized the booster of Sino-Africa ties.

However, the picture of China central government directing companies where to invest and how much to put on the table is rapidly changing with more and more private entities taking initiatives. Actually, the phenomenon has become so complex that Beijing's central government finds it difficult to control activities of these companies. According to McKinsey, nearly 90% of Chinese companies operating in Africa are private, therefore "calling into question the notion of a monolithic, state-coordinated investment drive". McKinsey (2007) goes on in saying "Although state-owned enterprises tend to be bigger, particularly in specific sectors such as energy and infrastructure, the sheer number of private Chinese firms working toward their own profit motives suggests that Chinese investment in Africa is a more market-driven phenomenon than is commonly understood".

Whatever the case, this dichotomy of private/public, which is the major differing factor of both Asian engagements in Africa, is progressively evolving; as Chinese business persons definitely engage with their African counterparts as Indians do. The Indian private sector has invested in a range a non-energy sectors namely manufacturing, hotels, IT and telecoms with Airtel as the main flagship. Yet, as the public/private OMEL

joint venture suggests, policy-makers in New Delhi have certainly concluded that private companies can only prosper in Africa with a proactive governmental push. As indicated by Chakrabarty, the input of Indian private led investment in Africa in the realm of development delivery is so far limited to contracting activities with Indian lines of credit serving as the main mechanism of development cooperation. Contrary to China that has established the China-Africa Development Fund (CADF), "India does not provide financial incentives for firms to invest in Africa or establish business relationships with African firms. Joint financing of projects through public-private partnerships is also rare" Chakrabarty (2017).

Importation of workforce

One advantage India enjoys against China in their African race, at least in the eyes of the general public, is that it does not export manpower to work on projects it finances. Sending thousands of Chinese workers to Africa is not well perceived by local populations because they feel they are deprived of employment opportunities that inevitably results in limited capacity building and technology transfer. Whether it is because of raw xenophobia or real charges of exploitation, this use of Chinese contract labor has already led to serious clashes in some parts of the continent (Zambia, Equatorial Guinea and Algeria).

On this issue, nobody actually knows about this feeling of resentment like the Indians. Actually, it is a similar resentment that nurtured the massive expropriation and expulsion they suffered in the 1970's from Uganda. Capitalizing on this painful experience, Indian ventures tend to be more integrated into the local economy today and employ more Africans. Where Chinese public-led investments are often accused of not creating any added value to African economies, Indian private companies have partnered with African local companies. This practice can be useful in reducing the potential of another community backslash.

A very active diaspora

Indian large Diaspora represents an important channel of influence for Delhi's engagement in Africa. Certain Indian families like the Madhvanis or the Methas, very active in Eastern Africa, have been in Africa for more than a century. Indian Diaspora therefore represents an excellent point entry for Indian business on the continent. Figures from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs indicate that 31 million Indians were living out of the country as of December 2018 with about 2.8 million in Eastern and Southern Africa. These people, who have been living on the continent for generations now, are very familiar with the local political landscape and economic realities, key factors to any investment ventures. Their

good knowledge of the general business environment, job and skills requirements and well as internal production capabilities make them extremely useful when it comes to choose the location of a business. In Kenya and Uganda for instance, they are leading in the finance, industrial and real estate sectors. "Although their involvement in local politics is almost inexistent, they are part of strong and powerful lobbying groups. The case of the Gupta family in South Africa illustrates their weight in the country's power circles" Samuel and Ihssane (2019). Indians and Africans from Indian descent serve as an extraordinary unique business facilitator and thanks to this dynamic Diaspora, Broadman believes that Indian ventures have "a deeper infiltration into the macroeconomic fabric of the continent" while the Chinese essentially "operate as enclaves on the African continent" Broadman (2007).

Actually, the truth looks rather different. A report, commissioned by the Japanese External Trade Organization to a South Africa-based socio-economic, political and security risk research and consultancy firm, reveals that China's diaspora living on the continent represents a strategic tool in supporting Beijing's ventures in Africa. Although figures on the exact number of Chinese living in Africa are difficult to grasp with accuracy, it is believed that around one million of them are found across the continent. Thanks to the social dynamics that exists within every Chinese community abroad, a broad range of experts, professionals, students, businesspersons provide crucial information to Chinese intelligence agencies that is used to enhance the country's influence in those countries. "Local Chinese expatriates are also active in local Chinese business associations and so- called friendship associations to a) leverage Chinese influence in such countries, b) undermine Taiwan's economic influence in Africa and c) provide a source of information on local economic and business developments. These friendship associations promote constant contacts with the PRC, through trips, seminars or "good will" visits of African and Chinese dignitaries" (ERA, 2009).

Soft power

In the fierce battle for influence, powerful states resort to what is known as "structural power" to shape other's states choices and options, that is, they manage to keep under control the conditions under which other states 'decision-making process is carried out. This generally includes controlling the international agenda of issues to be considered. This can also be done in a 'gentler' way, that is bringing other states to do what one desires based on the appealing potential of its own values. This is what Joseph Nye has labeled 'soft power', or the ability to exercise influence through attraction rather than through coercion 'hard power'. With regard to this, Nye (2002)

declares, "there is a much bigger payoff in getting others to want what you want, and that has to do with the attraction of one's ideas".

In China, Hu Jintao considered that promoting the country's soft power is an essential part of its "peaceful rise". While addressing the 17th congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2007, he declared, "Culture has become more and more an important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength". Therefore, China should "enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the peoples' basic cultural rights and interests" (Xinhua News, October 15, 2007). As concerning Sino-Africa relation, China projects itself culturally particularly in the medical and education domains.

Chinese medical missions in Africa are the Chinese best ambassadors to win the heart of the common African people. They have been going to Africa for a long time now and are truly appreciated by populations. Due to their simplicity and readiness to work sometimes in very difficult conditions as well as and their closeness to their patients, people keep them in really higher esteem on the continent. While waiting for Delhi's Pan African e-Network, specially its telemedicine dimension to deliver its full potential and let Africans enjoy the benefits of Indian progress in medicine, it will however take a lot to India to match China on this social terrain.

On the other hand, while taking 20-years investing risks, China has managed to make sure that part of the next generation of African leaders and elites will be China-friendly. The army of almost 30.000 Africans already trained in China rightly serves that purpose. "Calculating the influence of this academic training on future generations […] will be difficult to measure with any precision, but their experiences while in China certainly sensitize them to Chinese viewpoints and interests. In addition, they will possess the knowledge of the Chinese language, as well as Chinese society, culture, history and politics. Those who enter officialdom may be more accommodating of Chinese interests and demands. They will also share personal connections with former classmates and will move up professional hierarchies simultaneously"[2]. This appreciation from David Shambaugh on China efforts to train more students that are Asian equally holds for their African counterparts.

Even on this issue of capacity building where Indians claimed to have a relative advantage over China, Beijing is doing better. China is training far more Africans than do the Indians under their ITEC program. However, aware of the fact that training opportunities provided by India are simply too modest to stand any comparison with those of China, Delhi has equally stepped up its efforts in attracting young Africans by allocating more funds to capacity building. In this aspect, India is helping the African countries to bridge the digital divide with the launching of the 2nd phase of the Pan Africa e-Network

project – *e-VidhyaBharati* and *e-ArogyaBharati Network Project* (E-VBAB), which aims to provide 5 years free tele-education to 4000 students, free medical education to 1000 doctors/nurses/paramedics and free medical consultancy. Also, During the last 4 years, 6 IT Centers were established in South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Lesotho, Ghana, Namibia and Tanzania; a CGARD Technology Centre in Madagascar; 7 Vocational Training Centers in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Zimbabwe, and Egypt. A Technology Centre was also established in Zimbabwe. Entrepreneurship Centers are being set up in some countries. Yet, where Beijing spends huge amounts of public money in scholarships, thousands of bright minds from African Continent come every year on self-financing basis to Indian Universities and colleges. For these young people, it is showing the world that Africa has the capacity to forge its own future (The Economic Times, May 29, 2019).

Qualitatively also, China is stepping up its efforts to better grasp African realities. Chinese authorities have particularly tasked some academic institutions and think tanks to enhance the research capacity on African issues. It is the case of Nanjing University (Nanjing), Zhejiang Normal University (Jin Hua) and East China Normal University (Shanghai). On the continent soil, Beijing and Pretoria have jointly set up the Center for Chinese Studies (CSC). Located at Stellenboch University in the Western Cape Province, it is the first institution entirely devoted to the study of China in Africa. Still, there are no records of any initiative taken at the governmental level in India to raise awareness of Africa in Indian academic circles.

In addition, the Confucius Institutes headquarters' website indicates that 54 Confucius institutes have been already set up in Africa including 27 of them classified as "classrooms" in African existing universities. Even though it is still difficult to apprehend what role this spread of Confucius Institutes actually plays in an integrated China's Africa policy, Beijing has adopted, alongside with its political and economic forays, a more formal posture on this issue. Delhi who claimed a 'longstanding cultural impact' on the continent is still to systematize its cultural projection. , While the results of the Chinese soft power projection are still to be seen, India is struggling to follow the path.

Finally, in the symbolic realm, China has spent $200 million to build the African Union headquarters in Addis Abeba that was handed over in 2002 officially as a gift, but surely for Chinaas an expression of its growing presence in Africa. However, this achievement was tarnished in 2018 when the French newspaper *Le Monde* published an investigation showing that "China, which also paid and built the computer network at the AU, allegedly inserted a backdoor that allowed it to transfer data. The hack was not detected until January 2017 when technicians noticed that between midnight and 2

am every night, there was a peak in data usage even though the building was empty. After investigating, it was found that the continental organization's confidential data was being copied on to servers in Shanghai" (Quartz Africa, 2018).

CONCLUSION

Although the official discourse is that India is not going to Africa to compete with anyone, specifically China, the fact is that Indian economic and political offensives on the continent are conditioned by the China factor. Just to see how emphatically Indian officials try each time to distinguish their African policy from the Chinese's one represents the best indication of this fixation about China. The fact that relations between both states are mainly characterized by conflict, harsh rhetoric, mutual mistrust embedded in diplomatic language as well as quest for regional and global power, clearly indicates that China and India are bound to develop and deepen conflictual relations. Consequently, their engagement in certain parts of the global world, notably in Africa, will logically be reigniting conflicts between them. Nevertheless, as seen, owing to huge costs associated with fighting a war against another rising power, the competing powers make use of soft power in view of keeping the rival's ambitions under control. In this realm, "If India is compared with China in terms of economic ties with Africa; the former appears to have missed the opportunities offered by the huge untapped natural resources Africa is endowed with" Modi and Shekhawa (2009:33). However, how has India, with an important Diaspora living on the continent for many generations and whose commercial ties with Africa date back to the British colonial period, been outpaced by China in the race for Africa's resources?

The fact is that should the Indian engagement in Africa to be motivated by its ambition to counter China, their respective national economic capabilities are actually the main determinants of their projections and successes in Africa. Though India is certainly achieving notable results in his quest for African natural resources, China, that is more industrialized with less poverty on shore, will continue to strengthen its stronghold as a leading Africa's trading partner for a long time where it enjoys ten-year lead over India. For this reason, it is clear to us that in lieu of rivalry, India is battling to catch up. In this vein, its business model has certain parallels with Beijing's one while, contrarily to China, sourcing workforce in Africa and not from India constitutes it most appealing 'selling point'.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

REFERENCES

Biswas A (2016). The Importance of Africa in India's Energy Security in Ajay Kumar Dubey and Aparajita Biswas (eds.): India and Africa partnership: A vision for a New Future. (New Delhi-Springer) pp. 94-95.

Broadman H (2007). Africa's silk road: China and India's new economic frontier. The World Bank, Washington DC.

Chakrabarty M (2017). Indian Investments in Africa: Scale, Trends, and Policy Recommendation. Observers Research Foundation Working Paper.

Chakraborty D, Banerjee P, Sengupta D (2012). Developing Country Coalitions in WTO Negotiations: How cohesive would IBSAC (India, Brazil, South Africa, China) be?

Chand B (2019). Dynamics of Rivalry between Geographically Contiguous Regional Powers: The Case of Sino-Indian Competition. Asian Politics and Policy 1(11):122-143.

Chen C (2018). China and India' quest for resources and its Impact on the rivalry in. T. V. Paul (ed): The China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era. South Asia in World Affairs. (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press) 6(117).

Colaresi M, Thompson WR (2002). Strategic Rivalries, Protracted Conflict, and Crisis Escalation. Journal of Peace Research 39(3):263-87.

Davies M, Edinger H, Tay N, Naidu S (2008). How China delivers development assistance to Africa. Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch pp. 53-57.

Diehl PF, Goertz G (2001). War and Peace in International Rivalry. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press).

Downs ES (2007). The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations. China Security 3 (3):42-68.

Dubey AK (2008). Foreign Policy Of India With Special Reference To India's Africa Policy, Lecture delivered by Dubey AK at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, on November 21, 2008, available at http://diplomacy.bg.ac.yu/pdf/lecture_Dubey_20081121.pdf accessed on August 4, 2020.

Egreteau R (2007). The Analysis of Rivalry in International Relations: The Case of India and China. Research Question -CERI Sciences Po 23 (1).

Executive Research Associates (ERA) (2009). China in Africa: A Strategic Overview. Reports pp. 28-29.

Ian Taylor (2006). China's Oil Diplomacy In Africa. International Affairs. (82:5):937-959.

IDE-JETRO (2009). China's Energy Footprint in Africa. Available at .https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_07 .html, accessed on October 7, 2020

International Energy Agency (IEA) (2007). World Energy Outlook 2007. P 160. All figures in this section, if not otherwise stated, are quoted from this report.

Mansingh L (2009). Notes Towards India's New Africa Policy. Africa Quarterly 48(4):18-23.

McKinsey (2017) "The closest look yet at Chinese economic engagement in Africa", Op cit.

McKinsey and Company (2017). "The closest look yet at Chinese economic engagement in Africa" available at https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/middle-east-and-africa/the-closest-look-yet-at-chinese-economic-engagement-in-africa#,, accessed on October 8, 2020

Mitchell SM, Thies CG(2011). Issue Rivalries. Conflict Management and Peace Science 28(3):237.

Modi R, Shekhawat S (2009). India & China in Africa: Perceptions And Approaches. Africa Quarterly 48(4):33.

Mohan R, Powell (2015). Energy Rivalry between China and India: Less than Meets the Eye? in David Steven, Emily O'Brien, and Bruce Jones (eds): The New Politics of Strategic Resources: Energy and Food Security challenge in the 21st century (Washington DC : Brooking Institution Press) P 145.

Muller-Kraenner S (2008) .China's And Indian's Emerging Energy Foreign Policy. Discussion Paper, German Development Institute p.1

MThembu P (2018). China and India's Development Cooperation with Africa: The Rise of South Powers. (Palgrave Macmillan- London).
Today, India only accepts aid from multilateral donors like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and large bilateral donors like Japan, the United Kingdom, the US and the EU. Small amounts donors including Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden have been asked to direct their aid to NGOs.

Nola Nouck L (2009). Is The Financial Crisis Playing Against China In Africa? Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies 36(1).

Nye JS (2002). The Paradox of American Power: Why The World Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press) P 9.

Samuel A, Ihssane G (2019). The Rationale behind India's shift to Africa. Policy Brief, Policy Center for the New South P 4.

Sautman B, Hairong Y (2009). Enhancing Relations with Africa. The China Quarterly 199:728-759.

Shambaugh D (2004/05). China Engages Asia. International Security 9(3):64-99.

Tull DM (2008). The Political Consequences of China's Return to Africa" in Alden & al. (eds): China Return to Africa. A Rising Power And A Continent Embrace. (Hurst & Company: London), pp.111-128.

US Senate (2008). "China's Foreign Policy and Soft Power in South America, Asia, And Africa" available at China's Foreign Policy and Soft Power in South America, Asia, And Africa accessed on October 10, 2020.

William R, Thompson WR (2001). Identifying rivals and rivalries in world politics. International Studies Quarterly 45(4):558.

Related Journals:

African Journal of
Marketing Management

Journal of
Accounting and Taxation

Journal of
Economics and International Finance

International Journal of
Peace and Development Studies

International Journal of
Sociology and Anthropology

African Journal of
Business Management

Journal of
Geography and Regional Planning

Journal of
**Hospitality Management and
Tourism**

Journal of
**Public Administration and
Policy Research**

www.academicjournals.org